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Abstract 
This dissertation is a collection of three essays which study the impacts of different 
types of government ownership on a firm’s post-privatization performance, the 
underlying cause for the change in Chinese share-issue privatization listing strategies, 
and the equity flotation method selection mechanism of Chinese listed companies. 
In Chapter 1, I compare central government ownership with local government 
ownership in a privatization framework and investigate whether and how the two types 
of government ownership affect a firm’s post-privatization performance differently. 
With 757 partial privatizations through private placements in China over the period of 
2006 to 2015, I find that firms owned by the central government experience greater 
increases in real net profits, while firms owned by local governments have slightly 
better profitability improvements after private placement privatizations. However, firms 
owned by the two types of government experience similar post-privatization changes in 
capital investments, operating efficiency, and leverage. In addition, the market shows 
roughly the same level of positive reactions to privatization plan announcements of 
firms with either central government or local government ownership. My findings 
indicate that central and local government ownerships only have limited differences in 
their impacts on firm profitability and net profits. Overall, they have similar net effects 
on firm operations and performance although they have different advantages and 
disadvantages. 
During the early years of China’s share-issue privatization program, most large state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) were initially listed on overseas stock markets. This pattern 
changed dramatically after 2007, when Chinese domestic stock markets became 
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significantly more attractive to SOEs and most SIPs went public on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. In Chapter 2, we posit two explanations for this change in 
listing strategy. First, increasing Chinese stock market absorptive capacity might have 
given SOEs more incentive to list domestically because their financing needs could then 
be better satisfied in markets with higher absorptive capacity. Alternatively, the shift 
could result from the Chinese government’s enactment of new laws, regulations, and 
policies around 2007 encouraged (or forced) Chinese SOEs to list in Shanghai. Using a 
sample of 1,494 Chinese SIPs that raised $566 billion between 1990 and 2014, we find 
empirical support for both predictions. 
Chapter 3 compares three major equity flotation methods frequently employed by listed 
firms in Chinese markets. Rights offering was the dominant flotation method prior to 
2005. However, there was an apparent preference shift from rights offerings to private 
placements after 2005. We check the valuation effects of the three methods before and 
after 2005 and use a multinomial logit test to identify the determinants in the flotation 
method selection mechanism. Our results support the information asymmetry 
hypothesis by showing that firms with high level of information asymmetry tend to 
choose private placements and avoid public offerings. Ownership structure doesn’t 
seem to be an important factor determining the selection of flotation methods. 
Profitability requirements for refinancing prevent a lot of listed firms from raising 
additional external capital. The removal of profitability requirements for private 
placements in 2006 boosts the popularity of private placements and explains the shift 
from rights offerings to private placements to some extent. 
1 
Chapter 1: Types of Government Ownership and Post-Privatization 
Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Placement Privatizations 
 
1. Introduction 
Government ownership is generally considered inferior to private ownership and 
usually correlates with reduced firm value. This is attributed to the non-profit 
maximizing political or social objectives that governments may impose on enterprises 
with government stockholdings. The privatization literature shows that privatized firms 
experience improved profitability and efficiency1. This evidence reflects the downside 
of government ownership. However, government ownership can also play a positive 
role in firm operations. Firms with government backing may acquire some implicit 
advantages in business activities. For example, State-owned enterprises (SOEs) may 
have better access to financial markets, obtain project or land approvals from 
governments more easily, or have higher chances of receiving government sponsored 
bailouts than do private companies. In addition, governments can provide implicit debt 
guarantees for SOEs and therefore lower the cost of debt and reduce the probability of 
bankruptcy. However, it is noteworthy that governments are not all the same. The pros 
and cons of government ownership may express differently in firm operations for 
different types of government ownership. There is little evidence in the literature 
addressing whether different types of government ownership have the same impact on 
operations. In this study, I compare central government ownership with local 
                                                 
1  See Vickers and Yarrow (1991), Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994), Nellis (1994), 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998), D’Souza and Megginson (1999), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), 
Megginson and Netter (2001), Sun and Tong (2003), Wei, Varela, D’Souza, and Hassan (2003), Gupta 
(2005), and Li, Megginson, Shen, and Sun (2016). 
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government ownership and try to understand whether different types of government 
ownership have different impacts on firm value and performance. Focusing on Chinese 
private placement privatizations (PPPs), I check the market reaction difference between 
privatizations implemented by central government owned enterprises (CGOEs) and 
privatizations implemented by local government owned enterprises (LGOEs). I further 
compare the post-privatization performance improvements between CGOEs and 
LGOEs. 
From the existing literature, we have limited knowledge about the impacts of 
different types of government ownership on firm value and performance. Holland 
(2016) points out that government investors are not a homogeneous group. Equity 
markets react differently to government investments depending on government 
investors’ level of potential political interference. She finds positive shareholder wealth 
effects for investments by foreign governments or a domestic government’s economic 
and financial arms, and negative effects for investments by domestic governments or a 
government’s political arms. Karolyi and Liao (2015) examine cross-border acquisitions 
led by government controlled acquirers and corporate acquirers. Although their main 
purpose is to compare the investment patterns and preferences between government-
controlled acquirers and corporate acquirers, they divide their government-controlled 
acquirers into two subsets and further compare sovereign wealth fund (SWF) acquirers 
with non-SWF government controlled acquirers. They find that SWF acquirers tend to 
target larger firms with fewer financial constraints and SWF-led acquisitions are less 
likely to fail. Compared with acquisitions led by other non-SWF government agencies, 
SWF-led acquisitions are associated with significantly smaller positive market reactions 
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around announcements. Oum, Adler, and Yu (2006) examine the operating profitability 
and efficiency of airports with multiple types of ownership structure. They find that 
airports with private majority ownership have higher operating efficiency and profit 
margin than those with government majority ownership or multi-level government 
ownership.  
Several Chinese studies focus on different types of government ownership--
including Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2014); Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010); Cheung, Rau, 
Stouraitis (2010); and Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009). Berkman et al. (2014) examine the 
valuation effects around announcement periods of block-share transfers. They find that 
equity transfers from state bureaucrats to private entities are generally associated with 
greater positive valuation effects than transfers from state bureaucrats to market-
oriented SOEs. Jiang et al. (2010) conduct research on corporate abuse through 
intercorporate loans in China. They show that the tunneling problem is more severe for 
SOEs controlled by local governments than those controlled by the central government. 
Cheung et al. (2010) directly compare central government ownership with local 
government ownership and conclude that minority shareholders are more likely to be 
expropriated by local government controlled firms which is consistent with the 
“grabbing hand” hypothesis. However, central government controlled firms benefit 
minority shareholders through related party transactions which is consistent with the 
government’s “helping hand” hypothesis. Their results are echoed by Chen et al. 
(2009), who find that SOEs controlled by the central government show the best 
operating efficiency and SOEs controlled by state asset management bureaus and 
private firms have the worst operating efficiency. SOEs controlled by local 
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governments are in the middle. Both Cheung et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2009) 
plausibly suggest that central government ownership is superior to local government 
ownership.  
In this study, I compare Chinese central government ownership with local 
government ownership in a privatization setting. The significant post-privatization 
performance improvements documented in literature imply that government ownership 
has a negative net effect on firm performance. In other words, the disadvantages of 
government ownership outweigh its advantages in firm operations. When I divide 
government ownership into central government versus local government ownership, 
each type of ownership shows unique benefits and drawbacks on firm operations. 
Central government ownership provides a stronger certification effect and firms may 
have competitive advantage in business activities with national government 
endorsement. In order to maintain its credibility, the central government might also 
provide implicit guarantees of the debts issued by firms with central government 
ownership. Therefore, CGOEs may have lower cost of debts, preferential terms on bank 
loans, and easier access to financial markets.  
In addition, CGOEs are subject to stricter monitoring from the central 
government. Their managers are more professional and less likely to sacrifice firm 
interests to acquire personal benefits. However, the central government has heavier 
political and social responsibilities than local governments. Firms with central 
government ownership are more likely to experience interference by the central 
government in pursuit of non-profit maximizing national or political objectives. The 
managers of CGOEs, who are appointed by the central government, will help the 
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government implement its policies and take this kind of opportunity to show their 
loyalty to the central government even if it may hurt their firms’ performance. In terms 
of local government ownership, its certification effect is relatively weaker. Compared 
with the central government, local governments have fewer resources to guarantee their 
firms’ debts and to help LGOEs gain access to financial markets more easily. The loose 
monitoring from local governments might also accelerate corruption problems inside 
LGOEs. However, LGOEs are subject to lower levels of political interference, and local 
government officials indeed expect LGOEs to have better performance to promote local 
economic development. Since central and local government ownership each has its own 
advantages and disadvantages, the net impact of central government ownership could be 
superior to, inferior to, or equivalent to the net impact of local government ownership. It 
is this question that I empirically test in this study.  
I start with a standard event study examining the market reactions to 
privatization plan announcements. I select plan announcement dates instead of private 
placement announcement dates as my event days since these are the dates when the 
market receives the privatization information for the first time. Several firms have a 
long period of stock suspension after announcing their PPP plans. To ensure my 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) capture the market reactions to privatization plans, 
but not to some other new information generated in the suspension period, I exclude the 
PPP observations with stock suspensions for more than 30 trading days. I find that the 
market reacts positively to privatization plan announcements, regardless of whether the 
issuing firms are owned by the central government or local governments. For CGOEs, 
the CARs range from 1.21% in the three-day window to 2.99% in the 7-day window. 
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The market reactions for LGOEs range from 0.79% in the three-day window to 2.67% 
in the 7-day window. I realize that the observed positive reactions might reflect both 
privatization and private placement effects. However, my focus is to check whether 
central and local government ownerships may cause different market reactions in 
privatization processes. Therefore, I match CGOEs with LGOEs and examine the 
market reaction difference between my treatment group and control group. By 
subtracting CARs in the control group (LGOEs) from CARs in the treatment group 
(CGOEs), the private placement effects are cancelled out and the difference in market 
reactions is caused by the different types of government ownership of privatizing firms. 
I find that the market reaction difference between the CGOE sample and the matched 
LGOE sample is insignificant across all three event windows. It implies that investors 
do not expect firms with different types of government ownership to perform differently 
after privatizations. 
In the next step, I investigate whether CGOEs and LGOEs have different post-
privatization performance changes. I first check the pre- and post-privatization 
performance as well as the performance changes for both types of firms. I find 
significant increases in real sales, real net profits, and operating efficiency (measured by 
turnover) for both CGOEs and LGOEs. However, neither CGOEs nor LGOEs show 
significant improvements in profitability or capital investments. Firms owned by local 
governments tend to have a significantly lower leverage after privatizations, but the 
leverage change is not significant for firms owned by the central government. Except 
for the leverage change, my findings are roughly consistent with the results in Sun and 
Tong (2003). In this study, my core purpose is to figure out whether firms with different 
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types of government ownership have different post-privatization performance changes, 
and to further investigate whether different types of government ownership have 
different net impacts on a firm’s financial and operating performance. To achieve this 
goal, I consider CGOEs as my treated sample and use Mahalanobis metric matching 
(MMM) to match the treated sample with LGOEs. Then I take a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach by calculating the average difference in performance 
changes between my treated and control samples to compare the post-privatization 
performance improvements between CGOEs and LGOEs. I could have used a 
regression to realize the DID approach. However, a regression always assumes some 
kind of linear relationship between the covariates and outcome. When this relationship 
is non-linear, the regression gives biased estimates. In addition, regression models 
usually do a poor job when the treatment and control groups do not have sufficient 
overlap. Therefore, I employ MMM rather than a simple regression in this study 
because matching has no functional form and it only compares comparable units.  
I find a positive difference in changes of real net profits, which implies that 
CGOEs experience larger increases on net profits than LGOEs after PPPs. In other 
words, it suggests that central government ownership has a more negative impact on a 
firm’s net profits compared with local government ownership. In terms of profitability, I 
find significantly negative differences in changes of return on sales (ROS) and 
EBIT/sales when I use pre-privatization sales and ROS as matching variables. When I 
restrict my matched pairs to be selected from the same year or industry, the differences 
are no longer statistically significant but still remain negative. Therefore, I claim that 
LGOEs have relatively greater profitability improvements than CGOEs after 
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privatizations, and local government ownership is slightly inferior to central 
government ownership in terms of facilitating firm profitability. I do not find significant 
improvement differences in capital investments, operating efficiency, and leverage.  
In summary, although central and local government ownerships each have their 
own benefits and drawbacks on firm financial and operating performance, there is not a 
huge difference between central government and local government ownerships in terms 
of their net impacts on firm performance. Central government ownership has a more 
negative net effect on a firm’s net profits and CGOEs usually have larger increases on 
real net profits after privatizations. However, central government ownership is superior 
to local government ownership in terms of firm profitability. On average, CGOEs have 
lesser profitability improvements then LGOEs after PPPs. It indicates that central 
government ownership hurts a firm’s profitability less before privatization. The two 
types of government ownership have fairly similar impacts on a firm’s capital 
investments, operating efficiency, and leverage.  
I run a series of tests to check the robustness of my results. First, I use a 
regression approach to examine whether CGOEs have significantly different post-
privatization performance changes from LGOEs, and to control for several covariates 
such as sales, ROS, ROA, sales growth rate, current ratio, turnover, and leverage ratio. 
Second, I employ propensity score matching as an alternative matching method to 
match my treated sample with a new control sample, and check the differences in 
performance improvements between the two samples. I include sales, ROS, sales 
growth rate, turnover, and leverage ratio as my matching variables. The two robustness 
checks described above alleviate the concern that my simple matching strategy with 
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only two matching variables might not generate unbiased estimates. Third, I further 
separate CGOEs into those supervised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Committee (SASAC), SASAC CGOEs, and those which are not, 
designated non-SASAC CGOEs. SASAC CGOEs can better reflect the influence of 
central government ownership because they are subject to more direct, more 
professional, and more stringent supervision from the central government. I match my 
SASAC CGOEs with LGOEs and examine the differences in performance changes 
again. Last, in an unreported test, instead of checking mean differences, I use the 
Wilcoxon Z-test to check median differences between my treatment and control groups. 
The results from all robustness tests are either consistent with or stronger than my main 
results. Therefore, I believe my main results are robust.  
This study contributes to the literature examining the effect of state ownership 
on firm value and performance. A firm with state ownership has advantages as well as 
disadvantages since the government stockholdings may either help or hinder the firm’s 
operations. Most of the studies find that government ownership is associated with 
reduced firm value and is inferior to private ownership. However, government investors 
are not homogenous. There is little research examining whether different types of 
government ownership have the same impact on firm performance. In this study, I make 
a direct comparison between central government and local government ownership. In 
addition, my study also contributes to the privatization literature. Extensive empirical 
studies have proven that privatization works. However, I check Chinese SOEs’ post-
privatization performance from a new perspective. I investigate whether privatized 
firms with different types of government ownership have different levels of 
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performance improvements. My findings support Chen et al. (2009) and Jiang et al. 
(2010) in the sense that local government ownership has a more negative impact on firm 
profitability than central government ownership. Overall, however, I conclude that the 
two types of government ownership do not show major differences in their net effects 
on firm performance. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of central and local government ownerships separately, 
and develops three testable hypotheses. Section 3 provides a brief description of my 
data and explains the empirical methodologies employed in this study. Section 4 
presents my empirical results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
Government ownership is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it may benefit 
shareholders with the superior resources controlled by governments. On the other hand, 
it may be detrimental to firm value due to the inconsistent objectives between for-profit 
enterprises and governments. As shown in the literature, government investors don’t 
belong to a homogeneous group. The advantages and disadvantages of government 
ownership may show different intensities on different types of government investors. 
The advantages of central government ownership include stronger certification effect 
and better access to financing. CGOEs are backed by the central/national government 
which has greater credibility and more resources under control. The central government 
endorsement may enhance the trustworthiness of CGOEs and therefore bring stronger 
competitive advantage to CGOEs in business activities. It also gives CGOEs a better 
11 
chance of receiving government subsidies or bailouts [Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 
(2006), Duchin and Sosyura (2012)]. In addition, with an implicit guarantee from the 
central government, CGOEs have lower probability of defaulting on their debts, which 
reduces CGOEs’ cost of debt and helps them get loans from national banks on favorable 
terms or access financial markets more easily [Borisova and Megginson (2011), 
Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2014), Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson (2015)].  
Besides the advantages discussed above, Cheung et al. (2010) also point out that 
central government shareholders don’t expropriate minority shareholders, but instead 
add value to the holding firms through related party transactions. Chen et al. (2009) 
argue that CGOEs are subject to strict supervision and monitoring from several 
departments of the central government. The managers of CGOEs are carefully chosen 
and they usually have more business management skills and are less likely to encourage 
corruption. However, central government ownership has serious drawbacks for business 
operations which may hurt firm values. As Shleifer (1998) points out, governments 
have political and social objectives which may not be consistent with the profit 
maximization goals of for-profit enterprises. Because of the highly centralized political 
system in China, the central government is in charge of making national policies and 
bears more political and social responsibilities. This implies that the central government 
may impose a relatively higher level of political interference on CGOEs in order to 
achieve certain national political or social goals. This kind of interference may 
contradict the profit maximization goals and deteriorate the performance of CGOEs in 
the long run. In addition, managers of CGOEs are carefully chosen by the central 
government and they are evaluated by whether they can well execute orders and 
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earnestly implement directives from the central government. CGOEs are also subject to 
stronger monitoring from the central government. This indicates that the non-profit 
maximization policies of the central government will be implemented more thoroughly 
and efficiently even if they are at the expense of firm profits.  
Compared with central government ownership, local government ownership has 
quite different advantages and disadvantages. Local governments bear relatively less 
political and social responsibilities. Local government officials are usually evaluated 
and promoted based on the level of their local economic development, and local GDP 
growth is an important indicator in evaluations. It gives local governments incentives to 
support local business, to improve the performance of LGOEs, and to develop the local 
economy. To some extent, it aligns the interests of local governments and LGOEs and 
makes them become a common interest group. Therefore, local governments should 
have lower levels of political interference on LGOEs. However, the disadvantages of 
local government ownership are also obvious. First, local governments provide 
relatively weaker certification effects because local governments control fewer 
resources, possess limited administrative powers, and have less credibility compared 
with the central government. Second, local governments cannot provide LGOEs the 
same access to financing as the central government. Last, as mentioned by Chen et al. 
(2009), LGOEs are subject to weaker monitoring and supervision. The choice of 
managers of LCOEs contains a certain arbitrariness and LGOEs face a higher level of 
corruption risk. Cheung et al. (2010) also find evidence showing that local governments 
tend to expropriate minority shareholders of their portfolio companies through related 
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party transactions. This is consistent with the “grabbing hand” hypothesis proposed by 
Frye and Shleifer (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (2002).  
In summary, central and local government ownership each has its own relative 
advantages and disadvantages. The advantages will improve firm performance and 
increase firm value. However, the disadvantages will be counterproductive. An 
extensive privatization literature shows significant post-privatization performance 
improvements including higher profitability, better operating efficiency, and increased 
capital investments. It implies that the net effect of government ownership is negative 
and the performance of SOEs can be improved by reducing the extent of state control. 
Since central and local government shareholdings have different strengths and 
weaknesses, they may or may not display different impacts on firm performance. I 
intend to compare the net effect of central government ownership with the net effect of 
local government ownership, and to examine the difference of post-privatization 
performance changes between CGOEs and LGOEs. Three hypotheses are proposed 
below: 
1) CGOEs experience greater performance improvements after privatizations. 
2) LGOEs experience greater performance improvements after privatizations. 
3) Both CGOEs and LGOEs experience approximately the same level of 
performance improvements after privatizations. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
I collect 757 privatizations through private placements in China over the period 
of 2006 to 2015 from the WIND database. I focus on PPPs because more than 90% of 
14 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in China are executed through private placements 
starting from 2006. Among the 757 privatizations, 254 are implemented by CGOEs and 
503 are implemented by LGOEs. Stock price information is acquired from the Chinese 
Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Firm financial information 
is collected from the CSMAR and S&P Capital IQ databases. Table 1 shows the sample 
distribution over the ten years. Both CGOEs and LGOEs show similar distributions in 
my study period. I have the least number of observations in 2006 because the split share 
structure reform—examined in Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010), Firth, Lin, and 
Zou (2010), Li, Wang, Cheung, and Jiang (2011), and Liao, Liu, Wang (2014)—just 
started one year before, and the revised provisions for private placements were released 
in 2006 which relaxed the placement requirements and encouraged the use of private 
placements. My sample observations are almost equally distributed from 2007 to 2012, 
and the number of PPPs is gradually increased in the following three years. In total, 
SOEs raised 1,787.8 billion RMB through PPPs in the past ten years which is equivalent 
to US$268.3 billion based on the current exchange rate. Among the total capital raised, 
CGOEs account for almost 600 billion RMB ($90 billion) and LGOEs account for 
1,188 billion RMB ($178 billion). 
 I first examine the market reactions around the privatization plan announcement 
periods. A standard event study procedure is applied and the plan announcement date is 
set as day 0, since that is when the market receives private placement information for 
the first time. Market reactions are captured in three different event windows (a three-
day window from day -1 to day 1, a five-day window from day -2 to 2, and a seven-day 
window from day -3 to 3). The market model is estimated over the period of day -270 to 
15 
day -21. A unique problem regarding the market returns arises due to the fact that there 
exist two stock exchanges in China: the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Throughout this study, I use Shanghai Composite 
Index to compute market returns since the market size of Shanghai Stock Exchange is 
far greater than that of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and I can use a single market return 
as opposed to two. Nevertheless, I experiment with different market returns for the two 
stock exchanges, respectively, and construct a comprehensive market return which is a 
weighted average of the market returns in the two stock exchanges. The results are 
largely unchanged. If one SOE has more than two PPPs within one year, I only check 
the market reactions for the first one. Abnormal return is defined as the difference 
between the actual return and the predicted return from my estimated market model. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are reported as the sum of daily abnormal returns over the 
event windows.  
My main purpose is to investigate the market reaction difference and the 
difference of post-privatization performance improvements between CGOEs and 
LGOEs, which I will show are fundamentally different. In order to reduce the bias 
caused by confounding variables which might affect my outcome variables at the same 
time, I match CGOEs with LGOEs. However, I do not use propensity score matching 
(PSM) here because it is not appropriate in this setting given that the nature of 
enterprises (central government owned versus local government owned) is 
predetermined and almost never changes, which violates the key assumption of PSM 
that the conditional probability of receiving a treatment must be greater than zero and 
smaller than one. Instead, Mahalanobis metric matching is employed in this study. I 
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consider CGOEs as my treatment group, and then construct a control group with 
LGOEs whose pre-privatization characteristics mimic the CGOEs in the treatment 
group. I also restrict the control firms to be selected from the same year and the same 
industry. Given X as a vector of covariates, Mahalanobis distance measures the distance 
between two observations Xi and Xj  and is calculated as Dij  = √(Xi−Xj)′S−1(Xi−Xj), 
where S denotes the sample variance covariance matrix of X. MMM tries to match each 
observation in the treatment group with one or several observations in the control group. 
The Mahalanobis distance serves as the matching criteria and my purpose is to 
minimize the Mahalanobis distance between treatment group observations and 
corresponding control group observations. As Elizabeth Stuart suggested in her 2010 
Statistical Science paper, it is not proper to match on a large set of variables in small 
samples. Therefore, following Li, Megginson, Shen, and Sun (2016), I choose sales and 
ROS as my matching variables and then check the balance of all related covariates after 
my matching. Furthermore, I also include sales growth rate as my third matching 
variable for a robustness check.  
With the matched treatment and control groups, I examine the difference in 
CARs between the two groups to investigate if the market has different reactions to 
privatizations implemented by firms owned by different types of government. Besides 
that, I also examine whether there are significantly different levels of post-privatization 
performance improvements between the two types of firms. I specifically compare the 
changes in output, profitability, capital investments, operating efficiency, and leverage 
under a DID setting. The first difference captures the performance change before and 
after the privatization. I set the private placement year as year 0. The performance 
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change is measured as the difference between the average performance over the three 
years after the privatization (from year 1 to 3) and the average performance over the 
three years before the privatization (from year -1 to -3). SOEs are included in my 
sample only if their performance variables have at least one observation prior to the 
privatization as well as one observation after the privatization. The second difference 
captures the difference between CGOEs and LGOEs. After finding the post-
privatization performance changes for all observations in the treatment and control 
groups, I check the difference in performance changes between CGOEs and matched 
LGOEs and test for the significance level. 
 
4. Results  
This section details the results of several comparisons between central and local 
government owned SOEs. First, I match CGOEs with LGOEs and study the market 
reactions to announcements of privatizations implemented by the two types of SOEs. 
Second, I examine the performance changes following privatizations and check whether 
there is a difference in performance improvements between privatized CGOEs and 
LGOEs. Third, instead of matching the two types of SOEs, I use a DID approach to 
study the different performance improvements in a regression setting. Last, I further 
decompose CGOEs into two subsamples. One includes CGOEs supervised by the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the other one 
includes non-SASAC supervised CGOEs. Then I compare SASAC CGOEs with 
matched LGOEs to check the difference in performance changes. All results are 
reported below. 
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4.1. Covariates Balance Check 
  In order to compare central government ownership with local government 
ownership, I use MMM to match CGOEs with LGOEs. Due to the relatively small 
sample size, it is not feasible to match on a large number of variables. Therefore, 
following Li et al. (2016), I choose to match on size and profitability. The two selected 
matching variables are sales and ROS. A covariates balance check is made to ensure the 
validity of my matching. Table 2 shows the results of comparisons in 3-year averages 
prior to privatizations between treatment group and matched control groups. P-value 
and t-statistic are reported to show whether the difference between treatment and 
control groups is statistically significant. I find that all covariates are balanced, at the 
10% level, indicating that CGOEs and matched LOGEs are similar in the pre-
privatization period.  
4.2. Comparisons of Market Reactions 
         In this section, I check the market reactions in the privatization plan 
announcement periods. In a private placement process, several days can be chosen as 
the candidate event day. Since I want to examine the market reactions when new 
information about privatizations first comes into the market, I choose plan 
announcement date rather than placement announcement date as my event day (day 0) 
because plan announcement date is when the market receives privatization information 
for the first time. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for both CGOEs and LGOEs 
over three different event windows are reported in Table 3 panel A. I divide the entire 
sample into CGOE and LGOE groups according to their type of government ownership. 
Then I calculate CARs for the CGOE group and the LGOE group separately. As shown 
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in Panel A, the excess returns for privatizations implemented by either CGOE or LGOE 
are always positive and significant at the 1% level. CARs for LGOEs are larger than 
CARs for CGOEs by more than 2 percentage points on average, but the difference is not 
statistically significant.  
Looking at my entire sample in details shows that a small group of SOEs 
experienced stock trading suspensions for relatively long periods following their PPP 
plan announcement dates. For those SOEs, their CARs capture not only the market 
reactions to privatizations, but also the reactions to some other new information 
generated in the suspension periods. In order to eliminate market reaction bias caused 
by long suspension periods, I exclude the observations with more than 30 stock 
suspension days after the announcements of private placement plan. With the restricted 
sample, I still find significantly positive market reactions for both CGOEs and LGOEs. 
But the average reaction magnitude is smaller compared with the full sample results. 
The CARs for CGOEs range from 1.21% over the 3-day window to 2.99% over the 7-
day window and the CARs for LGOEs range from 0.79% over the 3-day window to 
2.67% over the 7-day window. The positive market reactions are not surprising because 
extensive empirical studies in privatization show significant post-privatization 
performance improvements which explain the market’s optimism when the information 
about potential privatizations is released. However, the CAR difference between CGOE 
and LGOE privatizations is not significant.  
In Table 3 panel B, I consider CGOEs as my treated sample, match them with 
LGOEs, and show the CAR difference between my treated and control samples. For the 
entire sample, the CAR difference is significantly positive with all three types of 
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matching implying that investors have more favorable reactions to PPPs by CGOEs. 
However, after eliminating the observations with long trading suspension periods, the 
significant difference in CARs between CGOEs and LGOEs disappears. From the 
results in Table 3, I conclude that the market considers PPPs as good news because 
extensive evidence shows that privatization improves firm performance and reduces 
potential political interference from governments. However, investors cannot 
distinguish between the impact of central government ownership and the impact of local 
government ownership on SOEs. The market has similar reactions to PPPs by firms 
with either central or local government ownership.  
4.3. Comparisons of Performance Improvements 
         In this part, I compare the post-privatization performance improvements 
between CGOEs and matched LGOEs. Performance is measured from five perspectives, 
including output, profitability, capital investments, operating efficiency, and leverage. 
In Table 4, I first check the performance changes of CGOEs and LGOEs separately. I 
report average performance of 3 years before and after privatization and also calculate 
the average performance changes from pre- to post-privatization periods. I include real 
sales and real net profits as my measures of output. Both variables are adjusted for 
inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). With my entire sample, I find strongly 
significant increases in sales and net profits for both CGOEs and LGOEs. In the 
profitability category, the traditional measures are return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE). However, PPPs in China are implemented by issuing a large block of 
new shares to a selected group of private investors with the purpose to dilute state 
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owned shares. 2  Therefore, the total assets and equity will automatically increase 
following PPPs and ROA and ROE will decrease mechanically even if SOEs keep the 
same level of profitability. So I do not consider ROA and ROE as my measures of 
profitability in this work. Instead, I use ROS to avoid this problem. However, ROS 
could be biased due to the fact that real net profits can be affected by preferential loan 
terms or tax rates.  
I include EBIT/sales as another measure of profitability to alleviate this concern. 
Neither CGOEs nor LGOEs show significant profitability improvements after 
privatizations. To check the change in capital investments, Capital expenditures/sales is 
employed as the main measure. I do not consider capital expenditures/total assets as an 
appropriate measure for the same reason stated above. But I report the results of both 
ratios for reference. Capital expenditures/sales does not change significantly following 
privatizations for either CGOEs or LGOEs. I do find significantly negative changes in 
capital expenditures/total assets for both types of firms. This decrease is possibly caused 
by the increase in total assets in the post-privatization period. It does not necessarily 
imply a decrease in capital investment after privatizations. Sales per employee and net 
profits per employee are used to measure the operating efficiency of SOEs. Due to the 
limited data on number of employees, my sample shrinks to 145 observations when I 
use a variable including number of employees. Therefore, the insignificant changes in 
sales per employee and net profits per employee may be caused by missing data. 
Turnover is calculated as sales over total assets and it is an alternative measure of 
operating efficiency. Since total assets will increase after private placements, this ratio 
is biased downward. However, I observe significant increases in turnover, implying that 
                                                 
2 The number of private placement investors is required to be equal to or less than 10 in China. 
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operating efficiency is improved for both CGOEs and LGOEs after privatizations. The 
results in this table are largely consistent with the findings in Sun and Tong (2003).  
         My main focus is the difference in post-privatization performance improvements 
between CGOEs and LGOEs. It reflects the different impacts on firm performance 
between central government ownership and local government ownership. I use MMM 
to match CGOEs with LGOEs and results are reported in Table 5. In the “No 
Restriction” column, the treated and control groups are matched on real sales and ROS, 
and I do not restrict the matched pairs to be selected from the same year or the same 
industry. In the “Same Year” column, matched pairs are selected from the same year. In 
the “Same Industry” column, matched pairs are selected from the same industry. 1:1, 
2:1, and 3:1 nearest neighbor matching are employed. Performance 
improvements/changes are measured by subtracting 3-year averages before 
privatizations from 3-year averages post-privatization. All numbers reported in this 
table are the average differences of performance improvements/changes between the 
treatment group (CGOEs) and the control group (LGOEs). A positive number indicates 
that CGOEs on average improve more on this outcome variable after privatizations. In 
the output category, although there is no significant difference in the improvements on 
real sales, I find that CGOEs experience a greater increase on real net profits after 
privatizations.  
On average, the post-privatization increase on real net profits for CGOEs is 80 
million to 140 million RMB more than that for LGOEs. It indicates that central 
government ownership has a more negative influence on a firm’s output before 
privatization, compared with local government ownership. I find a significantly 
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negative difference in profitability improvements when I match the two groups without 
restricting year or industry, which means that LGOEs experience greater profitability 
improvements after privatizations. When I restrict my treated and control pairs to be 
selected from the same year or industry, the statistical significance goes away but I can 
still observe the negative difference. Therefore, I conclude that central government 
ownership has a slight advantage over local government ownership in terms of firm 
profitability. In other words, local government ownership is more detrimental to firm 
profitability. This is consistent with the findings in Chen et al. (2009). In the next 
category, I compare the changes in capital investments following PPPs.  
Regarding capital expenditures/sales, except for two positive differences 
observed in the “Same Year” column which are statistically significant at 10% level, all 
other results are positive with relatively smaller but insignificant values. In addition, the 
difference in capital expenditures/total assets changes is trivial and close to zero. 
Therefore, I claim that central and local government ownership have similar impacts on 
a firm’s capital investments. In terms of operating efficiency, all results in this category 
are statistically insignificant regardless of the measure I use. Therefore, I conclude that 
the privatization effects on operating efficiency are approximately the same for both 
CGOEs and LGOEs. In other words, although central and local government ownerships 
have different advantages and disadvantages, their net effects on firm operating 
efficiency are similar.  
Leverage is measured by debt divided by total assets. The difference in leverage 
changes is extremely small and insignificant no matter how I restrict my samples. It 
implies that central and local government ownerships have nearly the same impact on 
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firm’s leverage ratio. Overall, I conclude from Table 5 that there is limited difference in 
post-privatization performance improvements between CGOEs and LGOEs. The most 
significant difference is between the improvements of real net profits. On average, 
CGOEs experience greater increase in net profits after privatizations. However, LGOEs 
usually have slightly better improvements in profitability than CGOEs after PPPs. The 
differences in changes of capital investments, operating efficiency, and leverage are 
statistically indistinguishable. These findings suggest that central and local government 
ownerships have similar net impacts on SOEs’ performance, although they each have 
their own distinct advantages and disadvantages.  
4.4. Robustness check  
         In my sample, the treatment and control groups are matched on real sales and 
ROS using MMM. In order to check the robustness of my main results and to alleviate 
the concern that my simple matching method may not be able to generate unbiased 
estimates precisely, I employ a multivariate regression analysis to control for more firm 
related characteristics, and also use PSM to construct a new control sample to examine 
the difference in performance improvements again. Related methodologies and results 
are reported below.  
4.4.1 Regression analysis 
         The main purpose of this study is to check whether CGOEs experience greater 
or lesser performance improvements than LGOEs after PPPs. This can be tested with a 
DID approach. The first difference captures the difference between central government 
owned and local government owned firms, and the second difference captures the 
performance difference before and after privatizations. I use the simple multivariate 
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regression shown below to examine the different performance changes between the two 
types of SOEs after privatizations.  
ΔPerformance = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Central + 𝛽𝑖Controls + ε                                           (1)                                                                     
The dependent variable, ΔPerformance, is calculated by subtracting the 3-year 
performance average prior to privatizations from the 3-year performance average post to 
privatizations. Central is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a partially privatized firm 
is owned by the central government. I add a number of control variables to control for 
firm specific characteristics prior to privatizations which include the pre-privatization 3-
year averages of real sales, ROS, ROA, sales growth rate, current ratio, turnover, and 
leverage ratio. The variable of interest is Central. A positive 𝛽1  implies a greater 
performance improvement for CGOEs after privatizations. In other words, it also 
indicates that central government ownership has a greater impediment effect on that 
specific performance variable. 
         Regression results are shown in Table 6. I only report the coefficient of Central 
under different performance variables. The results are largely consistent with my main 
results from MMM. Compared with LGOEs, CGOEs experience larger improvements 
in real net profits and capital expenditure/total assets, and have smaller improvements 
on profitability (including both ROS and EBIT/sales) after PPPs. For other performance 
variables in Table 6, CGOEs and LGOEs have roughly the same level of changes after 
privatizations. These results strongly suggest that central government ownership has 
more negative influence on a firm’s net profits than local government ownership. 
However, in terms of firm profitability, local government ownership has more severe 
negative impact. For other performance measures such as capital investments, operating 
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efficiency, and leverage, central and local government ownerships usually have similar 
impacts. 
4.4.2 Propensity Score Matching 
         As stated in the methodology section, it is not appropriate to use PSM to match 
CGOEs with LGOEs since firms normally cannot choose to be owned by the central or 
local governments. However, in order to alleviate the concern about the validity of my 
two-variable matching and to overcome the shortcomings of MMM when a large 
number of matching variables are included, I employ PSM as an alternative matching 
method and create a new control sample based on several new matching variables. The 
Probit model used for PSM is shown below.  
Central = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Sales + 𝛼2ROS + 𝛼3Growth + 𝛼4Leverage + 𝛼5Turnover + ε                                                                                                                                     
(2) 
The dependent variable, Central, is a dummy which equals 1 if a firm is owned 
by the central government. Sales is the real sales which is adjusted for inflation using 
CPI. ROS is return on sales. Growth is the sales growth rate. Leverage is calculated as 
debt over total assets. Turnover is defined as real sales over total assets. All independent 
variables are the 3-year averages prior to privatizations. I run the Probit regression with 
my entire sample and estimate the coefficients of all independent variables. Then I use 
the estimated coefficients to generate propensity scores for all CGOE and LGOE 
observations. Finally, I employ 1:1, 2:1, and 3:1 nearest neighbor matching to construct 
new control samples for my treatment group. I build three types of matched control 
groups. The first one has no restriction which means that the matched observations can 
be selected from any year and from any industry. The second one requests the CGOEs 
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in the treatment group and their matched LGOEs in the control group to have the same 
privatization year. The third one requires the matched pairs to be selected from the same 
industry.  
Following the same DID approach used in Table 5, I check the difference in 
performance improvements between the treatment group and the newly constructed 
control groups. Results are reported in Table 7. For real net profits, I still observe 
significantly positive results when there is no restriction. It means that CGOEs have 
larger increase in real net profits after privatizations compared with LGOEs. In terms of 
profitability, the results are not statistically significant but are still negative no matter 
whether I restrict the year or industry. Quantitatively speaking, it implies that LGOEs 
tend to experience larger profitability improvements after privatizations. In other words, 
local government ownership has slightly more negative influence on firm profitability 
than central government ownership. The results for other performance variables are 
largely insignificant which indicates that CGOEs and LGOEs experience similar 
changes in capital investments, operating efficiency, and leverage after PPPs. This is 
consistent with my main results implying that central and local government ownerships 
have approximately the same level of influence on firm operations and performance.  
4.5. SASAC supervised CGOEs versus LGOEs 
         In this section, I further decompose CGOEs into two groups based on whether 
they are under the supervision of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). SASAC is a ministerial-level ad hoc body 
directly affiliated with the Chinese State Council. Compared with other firms owned by 
the Chinese central government, CGOEs supervised by SASAC should have stronger 
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certification effects, face more intense political interference, and be subject to more 
direct, more professional, and more stringent supervision from the central government. 
It implies that the advantages and disadvantages of central government ownership 
become more apparent on SASAC CGOEs. In other words, the influence of central 
government ownership is better reflected on SASAC CGOEs. Therefore, I use SASAC 
CGOEs as my new treated sample and compare them with the matched LGOEs to 
further identify the difference between central government ownership and local 
government ownership.  
         Following the same procedure in Table 5, I select real sales and ROS as my 
matching variables and employ MMM to match my SASAC CGOEs with LGOEs. 
Then I examine the difference in post-privatization performance changes between 
treated and control samples. Comparison results are shown in Table 8. The findings 
from the comparison between SASAC CGOEs and LGOEs are largely consistent with 
my main conclusion. Furthermore, the results in Table 8 are at a higher significance 
level than the results in Table 5. The differences in real net profit changes are all 
significantly positive regardless of whether I put restrictions on year or industry. In 
addition, the average size of the differences is increased with my new treated and 
control samples, which implies a greater post-privatization net profit improvement for 
SASAC CGOEs. This strongly supports my previous finding that central government 
ownership has a more negative impact on firm net profits than local government 
ownership.  
Regarding profitability, the two measures, ROS and EBIT/sales, show results 
consistent with previous findings. Although significant results are concentrated in the 
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matching groups without year or industry restrictions, all results for the two profitability 
variables turn negative regardless of whether or not I place restrictions. This clearly 
shows that SASAC CGOEs experience smaller profitability improvements than LGOEs 
after PPPs, which supports the statement that local government ownership is inferior to 
central government ownership in terms of facilitating firm profitability. In this table, I 
also find a significantly positive difference in the improvement of capital 
expenditure/total assets. The results are persistent in the “No Restriction” groups and 
the “Same Year” groups. However, due to the reason that total assets will automatically 
increase after private placements, capital expenditure/total assets is not a good measure 
for capital investments. The results here are just for reference. Other performance 
variables in this table do not show significant difference between SASAC CGOEs and 
LGOEs. It signifies that the post-privatization performance changes in capital 
investment, operating efficiency, and leverage are not significantly different between 
SASAC CGOEs and LGOEs. Central and local government ownerships have similar 
degrees of influence on the performance variables listed above.  
 
5. Conclusion  
             Extensive empirical studies on privatization suggest that privatized firms 
experience significant performance improvements including higher outputs, greater 
profitability, increased operating efficiency, and larger capital investments. The positive 
post-privatization performance changes reflect the negative impacts of government 
ownership on SOEs. However, government ownership is a double-edged sword. Most 
privatization studies consider government investors as a homogenous group and the 
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widely confirmed negative influence on firms is a net effect of the interaction of 
positive and negative impacts of government ownership. Furthermore, as I mentioned 
earlier in this work, government investors are not homogeneous. The central and local 
governments each have different advantages and disadvantages for firm operations. It is 
important to investigate whether central and local government ownerships have the 
same net impact on firm performance. In this study, I make a comparison between the 
impacts of central and local government ownerships by examining whether CGOEs and 
LGOEs have similar post-privatization performance changes. I find that CGOEs usually 
experience larger increases in net profits and smaller improvements in profitability 
compared with LGOEs from pre- to post-privatization periods. However, the two types 
of SOEs have similar changes in capital investments, operating efficiency, and leverage. 
In addition, I do not find significantly different market reactions to privatization plan 
announcements of firms with different types of government ownership. Overall, central 
and local government ownerships are similar. They only have limited differences in 














For the first fifteen years of China’s massive share-issue privatization (SIP) 
program, most large sales of stock in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were executed on 
overseas financial markets outside of mainland China, usually either Hong Kong or 
New York. This was especially true from 2002 through 2007, when almost two-thirds 
of the 281 Chinese SIPs that raised US$184 billion during that period were listed on 
overseas markets.  This pattern changed dramatically in 2008, when 41 of 60 Chinese 
SIPs (raising a total of $28.2 billion) were listed in mainland Chinese markets, and 
almost three-quarters of the 794 Chinese SIPs executed during 2009-2014, raising a 
staggering $318.2 billion, were listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This marked change in listing strategies has thus far 
attracted little attention from either the privatization or the investment banking 
literatures, so this study will first document and then analyze the reasons why China 
shifted listing strategies so radically after 2007.   
Instead of analyzing why SIPs were listed in a domestic or foreign market, most 
existing studies either investigate the post-privatization performance of Chinese SIPs 
(Jia, Sun, Tong (2005), Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007), Sun and Tong (2003), and Li, 
Megginson, Shen, and Sun (2016)) or assess the motivations for overseas listings of 
Chinese SOEs (Hung, Wong, and Zhang (2008 and 2012), Sun, Tong, and Wu (2006 
                                                 
3 This chapter is based on collaborative work with William Megginson. 
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and 2013), and Zhang and King (2010)).  Busaba, Guo, Sun, and Yu (2015) proposed 
the “dressing-up-for-premium” effect to explain why Chinese cross-listed firms would 
like to list on overseas markets first and then return back to domestic markets.  
However, we believe the change in Chinese SIP listing strategies described above is 
noteworthy, and it is critical to find convincing reasons to explain the strategy change.  
We document the change in Chinese SIP listing strategies using the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) database.  As noted above, we find that from 2002 to 2007, an 
average of only 38 percent of Chinese SIPs were executed on domestic financial 
markets, implying that overseas financial markets were the main targets for Chinese 
SIPs.  However, starting in 2008, the ratio of domestic SIPs suddenly jumped up to 
more than 68 percent and remained at a relatively high level in the following six years.  
This huge increase in the ratio of domestic SIPs clearly illustrates that Chinese domestic 
markets have effectively replaced overseas markets and have become the new primary 
listing markets for Chinese SIPs. We also obtain statistical data about Chinese firms 
listing on the Hong Kong market from the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s 
website, since the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is the largest overseas listing market for 
Chinese SOEs. Starting in 1998, the number of H-share listings increased 
monotonically, indicating that the Hong Kong market received more and more attention 
from Chinese mainland firms.  However, this number dropped abruptly in 2008 and has 
remained relatively low since then, which also suggests that Chinese SOEs have shifted 
their attention from overseas markets to domestic markets since 2007. 
It is natural to ask why Chinese SOEs changed their listing strategies after 2007. 
Some people may think that this shift to domestic issuance might be caused by the 2008 
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financial crisis in the western markets. After checking our data in details, however, we 
find that this shift actually happened before the start of the financial crisis. Therefore, 
we don’t consider the financial crisis as a potential explanation for Chinese SOEs’ 
listing strategy change. Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (2004) and Megginson, Nash, 
Netter, and Poulsen (2004) suggest that SOEs’ listing market choice is related to market 
absorptive capacity, and we investigate whether this shift to domestic issuance was 
caused by a rapid increase in the absorptive capacity of domestic markets. We compute 
the ratio of a firm’s IPO issuing proceeds as a percentage of the total Chinese A-shares 
market value to act as a proxy for Chinese market absorptive capacity. A-shares are 
RMB-denominated ordinary shares in Chinese domestic companies that trade on either 
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges.  This ratio should be negatively related to the 
market’s absorptive capacity. Unsurprisingly, aggregate Chinese A-shares market value 
increases monotonically starting in 1991, immediately after China’s SIP program began, 
and a huge jump in market value to $2.43 trillion occurs in 2006, yielding an aggregate 
valuation three times the 2005 value of $781 billion.  In 2007, the market value jumps 
again to $6.23 trillion dollars, suggesting that the absorptive capacity of Chinese 
domestic markets was enhanced significantly in 2007 and stayed at a relatively high 
level in the following years. 
After documenting the enhanced market absorptive capacity, we test whether the 
change to Chinese SOEs listing strategy is related to the change in Chinese market 
absorptive capacity using a Probit model with an overseas listing dummy as the 
dependent variable. We control for firm financial level factors that can affect listing 
decisions and find that when Chinese domestic market absorptive capacity is low, 
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Chinese SOEs have a higher probability of choosing an overseas market for SIPs. After 
2007, because of the significant increase in market capacity, Chinese SOEs changed 
their strategy and now tend to list on domestic markets when they privatize through 
public share offerings. Our results are subject to potential reverse causality problems. 
On one hand, improved market absorptive capacity may give SOEs more incentive to 
list domestically, since their shares can be better absorbed by the market. On the other 
hand, when more firms choose to list in domestic markets, more funds will be attracted 
to the A-share market. Therefore, the market size will be enlarged and the market 
absorptive capacity will be improved. To alleviate this endogeneity concern, we use the 
lagged market absorptive capacity as an instrumental variable and run a Two-Stage 
Probit test. We still find a significant positive relationship between the probability of 
domestic listing and the predicted market absorptive capacity. We believe our results 
are robust.  
Besides this enhancement in Chinese market absorptive capacity, we also note 
that the Chinese government has been trying to build Shanghai into an international 
financial center over the past 20 years.  The former leader of the Chinese Communist 
party, Xiaoping Deng, first proposed developing Shanghai as an international financial 
center when he visited the city in 1991. During the 14th Chinese Communist Party 
Congress in 1992, the “Shanghai International Financial Center Plan” was formally 
presented as a national strategic decision.  From the early 1990s until 2006, the Chinese 
government’s main focus was the construction of financial infrastructure. The Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, China Foreign Exchange Trading Center, Shanghai Gold Exchange, 
and the China Financial Futures Exchange were all established in Shanghai during this 
35 
period.  In November 2006, the Chinese government published the “Shanghai 
International Financial Center, Eleventh Five-Year (2006-2010) Plan.”  This new plan 
suggested that the Chinese government’s focus had changed from the construction of 
financial infrastructure to deepening the development of financial markets, and 
emphasized the need to increase direct fund-raising and total trading volume of 
Shanghai’s financial market and enhance the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s capitalization.   
During this same period, a new Chinese “Securities Law” code was 
implemented to better protect investors and increase the capital market’s transparency. 
The Chinese government promulgated the “Criterion of Corporate’s Internal 
Governance” in 2008, requiring higher corporate governance and financial disclosure 
standards. Chinese President Jintao Hu and Chinese Premier Jiabao Wen made 
important speeches emphasizing that financial development should have a more 
prominent strategic position, and encouraging the Chinese government to create a 
favorable environment for financial development and to promote the Shanghai 
international financial center.  These actions and statements demonstrate the Chinese 
government’s commitment to building an Asian financial center by developing the 
Shanghai financial market.  Both Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) and Megginson, 
Nash, Netter and Poulsen (2004) point out that SIPs can facilitate stock market 
development, and governments would like to use SIPs to develop their own domestic 
financial markets.  It is thus reasonable to expect that the Chinese government guides 
SOEs to list first in Shanghai through the series of encouraging laws, regulations, and 
policies mentioned above. 
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To verify this prediction, we first use the propensity score matching (PSM) 
technique to generate a sample of comparator firms, thus allowing us to test for a 
statistically significant change in SOEs’ listing strategies around 2007 and assess if this 
change is purely caused by exogenous factors.  We set two dividing lines at 2007 and 
2008, respectively. SOEs that had SIPs before the dividing year are considered a 
treatment group, while SOEs listed after and including the dividing year are considered 
the control group.  The propensity score is the probability that one SOE may list their 
shares before the dividing year.  We use six different matching algorithms to match the 
treatment group with the control group.  Then we compare the outcome (probability of 
overseas listing) for Chinese SOEs before and after the dividing year and find a 
significant difference between the treatment and control groups.  After verifying the 
listing strategy change, we collect the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s total market value, 
number of annual total transactions, annual total trading volume, and annual total 
turnover from 1999 to 2012 and find that all four of these factors experienced a huge 
jump around 2007. These large enhancements to the Shanghai financial market appear 
to coincide with—and perhaps were at least partly caused by—the Chinese 
government’s encouraging policies, and the clear change of Chinese SOEs listing 
strategy after 2007 reinforces the belief that SOEs were encouraged to list first on the 
Shanghai market through a series of changes in the Chinese government’s policy.   
We further identify the channel through which the Chinese government 
encourages/forces SOEs to choose domestic markets to issue new shares. We 
hypothesize two channels. The first one is a policy channel. The Chinese government 
can implicitly encourage SOEs to list domestically by implementing a series of new 
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encouraging policies. In this case, both SOEs and private firms will be affected and we 
expect to see similar shift to domestic issuance patterns for both types of firms. The 
second channel is through administrative instructions. The Chinese government can 
implicitly force SOEs to issue new shares in domestic markets by giving administrative 
instructions to the managers of SOEs who are appointed by the government. Managers 
have incentive to execute the instructions to please the government and to expect 
potential promotion in the future. In this scenario, we should only observe the shift on 
SOEs but not on private firms. We compare the listing strategy patterns of both SOEs 
and private firms and find evidence supporting the policy channel.  
We believe our paper significantly contributes to the Chinese privatization and 
capital market development literature. To our knowledge, we will be the first to 
document and analyze the discontinuity in the pattern of Chinese SOE share issuance 
that occurred after 2007. Besides describing this pattern discontinuity in foreign-versus-
domestic issuance, we also provide two reasonable explanations. First, we show that the 
percentage of domestic issuance is closely related to the domestic market absorptive 
capacity. We believe that the shift from overseas to domestic issuance was caused by a 
rapid increase in the absorptive capacity of Chinese domestic financial markets. Second, 
the Chinese government intentionally encourages/forces Chinese SOEs to list on 
domestic markets to deepen the development of Chinese financial markets. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
sample employed and presents preliminary results on the changes in SIP listing 
strategies. Section 3 describes three hypotheses that might explain these changes. 
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Section 4 describes the models and methods used to test these hypotheses. Section 5 
presents test results and section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Data and Observations 
We download all Chinese Share-Issue Privatization (SIP) transaction data for the 
years 1990-2014 from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. We also acquire 
firm level financial data from Compustat, CSMAR (China Security Market and 
Accounting Research), and WIND databases. Shanghai stock exchange market data are 
acquired from the official website of Shanghai stock exchange. From the transaction 
data, we can identify the listing market of each SIP transaction. In our dataset, Chinese 
SOEs’ major listing markets include the two Chinese domestic markets (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange), as well as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 
the New York Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. At least a few SIPs are also listed on 
other markets, including the Australian Securities Exchange, the Singapore Exchange, 
and the Toronto Stock Exchange. We also record whether a particular share sale is an 
initial public offering (IPO) or a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Additionally, a rights 
offering flag shows whether a specific share offering is sold only to existing 
shareholders or to the public. These screens yield 1,494 SIP transactions from 1990 to 
2014, and this sample is summarized in Table 9.  
Table 9 shows that 793 of the 1,494 SIP listings (53.1%) are IPOs.  The total 
number of SIP listings and total capital raised increased dramatically during 2002-
2007—from 27 SIPs raising $5.1 billion in 2002 to 87 sales raising $73.2 billion during 
2007. This was followed by a sharp fall in 2008 (60 offerings raising $28.2 billion), a 
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resurgence in 2009 (80 SIPs worth $45.0 billion), and then strong annual sale numbers 
and capital-raising totals (averaging 155 offerings raising $63 billion each year) from 
2010 through 2013. Both the number (94) and aggregate value of capital raised ($21.2 
billion) fell sharply in 2014.  In 2002, there were only 21 SIP listings with total capital 
raised of $5.07 billion. Focusing on the “percentage of domestic SIP” column reveals an 
apparent discontinuity in the pattern of domestic issues after 2007.  In the period from 
2002 to 2007, most Chinese SIPs were accomplished in overseas stock markets, and the 
percentage of domestic SIP listings was always below 48%. From 2008 onwards, 
however, there was a sudden change in this pattern with 68.3% of SIPs being sold on 
Chinese domestic markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen) in 2008 and 65.0% in 2009. In 
subsequent years, the rate of Chinese domestic SIP listings stayed above 71%.  These 
data clearly show that Chinese domestic stock markets became much more attractive to 
Chinese SOEs in their SIP process after 2007. Over the entire 1990-2014 study period, 
there are 997 domestic offerings, accounting for 66.7% of the 1,494 total SIPs.  
The SDC database reveals that the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has the largest 
number of Chinese SIP listings and is the main overseas listing market for Chinese 
SOEs. The China Securities Regulatory Commission’s website provides a summary 
table about Chinese H-share listings (Chinese domestic firms listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange). We download the original table from their website and corrected a 
currency conversion error. The revised version is shown in Table 10. The data include 
both government owned and privately owned companies listed on the Hong Kong 
market. The column “Total Capital Raised” in Table 10 shows that the amount of 
capital raised by Chinese firms (both SOEs and private firms) on the Hong Kong market 
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increased continuously from $569 million in 1999 to $39.4 billion in 2006, implying 
that Chinese firms significantly increased their dependence on overseas markets for 
fund raising during that period. The total amount of capital raised dropped sharply in 
the following two years, to $12.7 billion in 2007 and a mere $4.6 billion in 2008. Total 
capital raised in Hong Kong rebounded in 2009 and subsequent years, but only 
exceeded $18 billion once ($35.4 billion in 2010) and never again reached the 2006 
level. Turning to the number of new listings, an increasing number of Chinese firms 
chose to list in the Hong Kong between 2000 and 2006, again indicating that overseas 
markets became more attractive to Chinese listing corporations in that period.  
However, the number of new listings dropped sharply from 23 in 2006 to 7 in 2007, and 
remained at single-digit levels from 2008 to 2013. Table 10 clearly shows that the Hong 
Kong market has lost its attraction as a listing venue for both government owned and 
privately owned Chinese enterprises since 2007. This is consistent with the observations 
based on SDC data showing that Chinese SOEs shifted their attention from overseas 
markets to domestic markets starting in 2007. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) argue that SIPs can facilitate stock market 
development, and Megginson, et al. (2004) show that SIPs are more likely to happen in 
countries with less developed capital markets because their governments intend to use 
SIPs to develop their domestic financial markets’ liquidity and absorptive capacity.  
Following this logic, the Chinese government should choose to list their SOEs in 
domestic markets through an IPO first and then consider cross-listing overseas later. 
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Interestingly, the process in China was reversed. The reasons for Chinese SOEs’ foreign 
primary listing has been widely investigated. Sun, Wu, and Tong (2008 and 2013) 
explain that the positive effect of SIPs on the development of the domestic market may 
have a limit, especially when the domestic market is not well developed and cannot 
absorb rapid and large-scale SIPs. In this case, it may be optimal to carry out a SIP on 
overseas markets to maintain order in the domestic market. However, in recent years, 
especially after 2007, Chinese capital markets have developed significantly.  A new 
Chinese “Security Law” was published in 2006 and this new law lowers the barriers for 
IPOs and mitigates the issue that Chinese firms’ listing demand is much higher than the 
quota that was given by the Chinese government.  Domestic capital markets have 
become more integrated, and we believe Chinese market absorptive capacity has 
improved much in recent years.  This leads to our first hypothesis: The discontinuous 
pattern of percentage domestic issuance (shift to domestic issuance) in China after 2007 
was caused by a rapid increase in absorptive capacity in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
markets.  This enhanced market absorption allowed larger individual and aggregate 
SIPs in China and gave Chinese SOEs greater incentives to change their listing 
strategies and choose domestic markets, thus facilitating Chinese capital markets 
development.  
Our second hypothesis is: The shift to domestic issuance in China after 2007 
was caused by a major change in government policy strongly encouraging/forcing 
Chinese SOEs to list first in Shanghai.  As we have previously stated, the Chinese 
government has been trying to build Shanghai into an international financial center over 
the past 20 years.  As noted above, the former leader of the Chinese Communist party, 
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Xiaoping Deng, first proposed the idea to develop Shanghai as an international financial 
center when he visited Shanghai in 1991 and the 14th Chinese Communist Party 
congress in 1992 formally presented the “Shanghai International Financial Center Plan” 
as a national strategic decision. In 2006 the Chinese government published a new plan, 
changing the policy focus from construction of financial infrastructure to deepening the 
development of financial markets. A Chinese securities law designed to better protect 
investors and increase capital market transparency was also published that year, while 
the Chinese government promulgated the “Criterion of Corporate’s Internal 
Governance” requiring higher corporate governance and financial disclosure standards 
in 2008. Chinese leaders made important speeches emphasizing financial development, 
encouraging creation of a favorable environment for financial development, and 
promoting the construction of the Shanghai international financial center.  From the 
Chinese government’s actions mentioned above, we can see the commitment from the 
Chinese government to build an Asian financial center through the development of the 
Shanghai financial market.   
As an extension to our second hypothesis, we also explore the channels through 
which the Chinese government implicitly/explicitly encourages/forces SOEs to list in 
domestic markets first. There are usually two ways used by the Chinese government to 
change a SOE’s listing strategy. They can either implicitly encourage Chinese SOEs to 
choose domestic markets through a series of encouraging policy changes or explicitly 
force Chinese SOEs to list domestically through administrative instructions. To 
differentiate the two channels, we compare Chinese SOEs with Chinese private firms 
and ask whether SOEs and private firms have the same shift to domestic issuance 
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pattern. If it is through the policy channel, both SOEs and private firms will be affected 
by the encouraging policy changes. Therefore, we should observe the shift to domestic 
issuance pattern for both types of firms. Furthermore, since private firms operate more 
efficiently and are more sensitive to policy changes, their shift to domestic issuance 
pattern could be more pronounced comparing to the pattern of SOEs. If this shift is 
through the administrative instruction channel, only SOEs will be affected. The 
managers of SOEs are appointed by the Chinese government and they have incentive to 
obey and execute the administrative instructions from the government to exchange for 
potential promotions in the future. However, the government has relatively weaker 
control/impact on private firms. They rarely affect a private firm’s decision through this 
kind of informal administrative instructions. Therefore, we should observe the shift to 
domestic issuance pattern on SOEs, but not on private firms. We list our two mutually 
exclusive testable hypotheses below: 
Hypothesis 3a: A similar or more significant shift to domestic issuance pattern 
is observed on private firms; 
Hypothesis 3b: No similar shift to domestic issuance pattern is observed on 
private firms.  
 
4. Methodology 
We begin with a preliminary test to check the enhancement of Chinese capital 
market absorptive capacity in recent years. We use the ratio of a firm’s issuing proceeds 
over the total Chinese A-shares market value (referred as “AC ratio” in what follows) to 
act as a proxy for Chinese market absorptive capacity. If this absorptive capacity is 
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enhanced, the AC ratio would be expected to decrease significantly, and vice versa. All 
Chinese SOEs that listed in overseas and domestic markets from 1991 to 2012 are 
included to calculate the AC ratio. First, we compute the AC ratio for each individual 
firm, then we group firms based on their listing years. Finally, we compute the average 
AC ratio for each year in our study period and call this the annual AC ratio. After 
performing the above three steps, we check whether there is a discontinuity in the AC 
ratio after 2007 that potentially could be related to the shift to domestic issuance. We 
also compute the means and variances of AC ratios before 2007 and after 2007 and run 
a t-test to see whether the two average AC ratios are significantly different. This 
preliminary test shows whether Chinese capital market absorptive capacity has 
improved in recent years.  
Following the preliminary test, we use a Probit test to rigorously investigate 
whether the change in the Chinese capital market absorptive capacity contributed to the 
discontinuity in the percentage domestic issuance. We hypothesize that Chinese SOEs 
switched their listing strategies after 2007 due to the enhancement of Chinese market 
absorptive capacity and use the following Probit model to test our first hypothesis: 
OL = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1*AC ratio + 𝛽2*Size + 𝛽3*ROA + 𝛽4*LEV + 𝛽5*LIQ + Σ𝛼𝑖*𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 
+ Σ𝛾𝑗*𝑌𝑅𝑗 + ε                                                                                                                 (3) 
The dependent variable, OL (Overseas Listing), is a dummy variable equaling 1 
if the SOE is listed on overseas markets and 0 if listed on domestic markets.  The 
independent variable of greatest interest is the AC ratio. Based on our hypothesis, 
higher domestic market absorptive capacity (lower AC ratio) should be related to more 
domestic issuances (lower probability of an overseas listing), so the coefficient, 𝛽1, is 
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expected to be positive. Size is the variable firm size, measured as the natural logarithm 
of a SOE’s total assets.  ROA stands for return on asset (net income / total assets), 
which is a proxy of a SOE’s profitability. LEV is the leverage ratio, equal to total debt 
divided by total shareholder’s equity. LIQ denotes liquidity, measured here as the quick 
ratio ((current assets – inventories) / current liabilities) as a proxy for a SOE’s liquidity.  
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖  is an industry dummy variable, equaling 1 if a SOE is in industry i and 0 
otherwise. 𝑌𝑅𝑗 is a year dummy variable, equal to 1 if a SIP is occurred in year j and 0 
otherwise.  
Hypothesis 2 is difficult to test directly.  From the data, we can clearly observe 
the discontinuous pattern in the percentage domestic issuance after 2007, but it may be 
too early to conclude that the Chinese SOEs’ shift to domestic issuance after 2007 is 
caused by a major change in government policy. SOEs that had SIPs before 2007 may 
not be directly comparable with SOEs that had SIPs after 2007 because the privatization 
time was not randomly chosen.  The SOEs with SIPs after 2007 may systematically 
differ from the SOEs with SIPs before 2007 due to the difference of some firm related 
confounding variables.  This concern motivates us to use a propensity score matching 
(PSM) technique to make the SOEs before and after 2007 comparable. In this way, we 
can tell if the Chinese SOEs’ strategy change is statistically significant and thus caused 
by some exogenous factors changing around 2007.  
In the first test, we set Chinese SOEs that had SIPs before 2007 as a treatment 
group.  SOEs that had SIPs in or after 2007 were set as the control group. Baseline 
variables (confounders) include firm size, return on asset, liquidity, and leverage ratio.  
The propensity score is the probability that one SOE may have listed its shares before 
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2007. We include six matching algorithms: Kernel Matching (Normal), One Nearest 
Neighbor Matching with replacement, One Nearest Neighbor Matching without 
replacement, Three Nearest Neighbor Matching with replacement, Radius Matching, 
and Kernel Matching (Epan).  After the PSM, we compare the outcome (probability of 
overseas listing) for Chinese SOEs before and after 2007. Taking into consideration the 
policy lag effect, we also perform a second propensity score matching, setting the SOEs 
with SIPs before 2008 as the treatment group, and the SOEs with SIPs in or after 2008 
as the control group.  After the two PSMs above, we check the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange’s total market value, number of annual total transactions, annual total trading 
volume, and the annual total turnover from 1999 to 2012 (the last year for which SSE 
data are available).  The improvement in the Shanghai financial market can illustrate 
our second hypothesis that the Chinese government uses policies to encourage/force 
SOEs to list first on the Shanghai market to promote Shanghai into a center of 
international finance in Asia. 
To test the third hypothesis, we first employ a standard Probit model to check 
whether private firms have lower probability to list overseas after 2007. The model is 
described below: 
OL = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1*After2007 + 𝛽2*AC ratio + 𝛽3*Size + 𝛽4*ROA + 𝛽5*LEV + 
𝛽6*LIQ + Σ 𝛼𝑖*𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + ε                                                                                                (4) 
After2007 is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if an equity offering happens 
in 2007 or later. Other variables are defined in the same way as the ones in equation (3). 
Due to the possible policy lag effect, we also change the dividing year from 2007 to 
2008 and run the same Probit test again. In order compare the SOE pattern with the 
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pattern of private firms, we use a difference in differences (DID) setting to examine 
whether SOEs are more likely or less likely to choose overseas markets after 2007 
comparing to private firms. The model is shown below: 
OL = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1*SOE + 𝛽2*After2007 + 𝛽3*SOE*After2007 + 𝛽4*AC ratio + 
𝛽5*Size + 𝛽6*ROA + 𝛽7*LEV + 𝛽8*LIQ + Σ𝛼𝑖*𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + ε                                           (5) 
SOE is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the issuing firm is a SOE. All 
other variables are defined in the same way with the ones in equation (4). We interact 
SOE with After2007. This term catches how the SOE pattern is different from the 
pattern of private firms and is of our interest. We also change our dividing year from 
2007 to 2008 to alleviate the concern about policy lag effect.  
 
5. Results 
Table 11 presents our preliminary test results. The annual average AC ratio 
column indicates that this ratio maintained a relatively high level from 2000 to 2005, 
but then dropped about 59% from 9.33*10−4 in 2005 to 3.88*10−4 in 2006. The AC 
ratio decreased again to 1.36* 10−4  in 2007, and stayed around that level during 
subsequent years. Since a lower AC ratio means a higher market absorptive capacity, 
this suggests that the Chinese capital market’s absorptive capacity has been 
significantly enhanced in recent years, particularly since 2007. It is reasonable to 
believe that this discontinuity in the annual AC ratio and improvement in market 
absorptive capacity may have some connection with Chinese SOEs’ shift to domestic 
issuance.  
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Table 12 reports results from using a Probit test to check if the discontinuous 
pattern of the percentage domestic issuance was contributed by the rapid increase in the 
capital market absorptive capacity in China. Model 1 is a univariate test with AC ratio 
as the only independent variable. Model 2 includes control variables, but these do not 
control for the time fixed effect. Model 3 is the complete model presented in equation 
(3), and includes year dummies to control for the time fixed effect. As expected, the 
coefficients of the AC ratio are positive and statistically significant in all three models. 
This means Chinese SOEs are more likely to list in overseas markets when the Chinese 
domestic market absorptive capacity is lower (higher AC ratio), but higher market 
absorptive capacity will in turn give Chinese SOEs more incentive to list domestically 
to facilitate the development of domestic capital markets when they have SIPs. Since 
the market’s absorptive capacity has improved sharply since 2007, it is reasonable to 
believe that the shift to domestic issuance after 2007 can be explained by enhanced 
capital market absorptive capacity in China.   
              In order to alleviate the reverse causality concern, we use lagged AC ratio as an 
instrumental variable (IV). Lagged AC ratio is calculated as a firm’s issuing proceeds in 
year t over the total Chinese A-share market value in the previous year (t-1). It measures 
the market absorptive capacity assuming the firm had issued the same amount of shares 
one year earlier. Table 13 shows the results of our Two-Stage Probit model. In the first 
stage, we regress the endogenous variable, AC ratio, on lagged AC ratio and other 
exogenous variables. The correlation between our endogenous variable and IV is 
confirmed. In the second stage, we regress overseas listing dummy on the estimated AC 
ratio and other control variables. The results indicate that when the domestic market 
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absorptive capacity is lower, Chinese SOEs are more likely to list their shares on 
overseas markets. This is consistent with our previous findings and our results are 
robust. 
Table 14 displays the results of propensity score matching. The “Unmatched” 
column shows the results without performing PSM for treatment and control groups. In 
this test, we use the six different matching algorithms introduced in section 3, and 
results are shown in the table labeled with the names of the matching algorithms. 
Results suggest that if there is no PSM, there is a significant difference in propensities 
for overseas listing between the groups before and after 2007. Using the PSM technique 
with the dividing line in 2007, and comparing the probabilities of overseas listing for 
Chinese SOEs that had SIPs before 2007 and after 2007 (including 2007), yields 
insignificant results. In other words, if we control for key baseline variables for both the 
treatment and control groups, the difference between them disappears. This result 
seemingly contradicts our predictions. However, as discussed in section 2, most of the 
influential policies aimed at developing the capital market and establishing an 
international financial center in Shanghai were published at the end of 2006 or in 2007.  
There is always a lag between the time a policy is published and the point when people 
can see the effect of the policy. If we take the policy lag effect into consideration, and 
put the dividing line in 2008, the results of PSM show high statistical significance. This 
result suggests that controlling for the baseline variables for both groups with SIPs 
before and after 2008 (including 2008), we can still observe significantly different 
probabilities of overseas listing between treatment and control groups.  This difference 
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appears to be caused purely by exogenous factors that are specific to the treatment (in 
this case, the treatment is the year change).   
As a supplement to our matching technique, we also run a Probit test to check 
for listing strategy change after 2007 (or 2008). The Probit model being used is the 
same as equation (4). Since we have already known that the market absorptive capacity 
may affect a SOE’s listing decision, we include AC ratio in this Probit model along with 
some other confounding variables and check whether there are some other exogenous 
factors besides the market absorptive capacity affecting the listing strategy of SOEs. 
Our results are shown in Table 15 and are largely consistent with the ones in Table 14. 
Chinese SOEs are still more likely to choose Chinese domestic markets to issue new 
shares since 2008 after controlling for the impact of market absorptive capacity. It 
indicates some other exogenous factors such as policy changes around the same period 
may affect the listing decision of Chinese SOEs.   
As hypothesized in section 2, policy changes around 2007 could be the outside 
factors that caused SOEs to change their listing strategies. The Chinese government 
promulgated a series of policies to facilitate the development of a capital market and 
establish an international financial center in Shanghai around 2007. In order to verify 
whether the financial market in Shanghai was improved by the development-related 
policies, we collect from the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s website the market cap, 
number of annual total transactions, annual total trading volume, and annual total 
turnover in the period from 1991 to 2012. These are shown in Figure 1.   
In all of the four panels, we can see that the curves are initially (from 1991 to 
2005) at a relative low level. The markets accelerate development from 2005 to 2006, 
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and then there is a huge jump for all four curves from 2006 to 2007. The development 
variables have remained at a relatively high level after 2006, especially compared to the 
pre-2006 period. The shapes of the four curves consistently indicate the significant 
development/improvement of the Shanghai Stock Exchange after 2007, which itself 
reflects the benefits of the new published policies, and shows the commitment of the 
Chinese government to build Shanghai into an international financial center. That said, 
it is reasonable to believe that the Chinese government encouraged/forced SOEs to list 
domestically to facilitate the development of the Shanghai market through some policy, 
law, or other special means so that they can achieve their goal of positioning Shanghai 
as a major international financial center.   
To test our third hypothesis, we collect the share issuance data for Chinese 
private-owned firms which listed on domestic and overseas markets during 1991 to 
2014 and compare their listing strategy pattern with the pattern of Chinese SOEs. We 
first identify the listing markets of the firms in our sample in each year. Then, we 
calculate the percentage of domestic issuance for private-owned firms based on the total 
numbers of domestic and overseas listings in each year. The statistical description of 
our private-owned firm sample is shown in Table 16. We compare the two patterns of 
percentage of domestic issuance for both Chinese SOEs and private firms and the 
results are shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Panel A shows the percentage of domestic SIPs for Chinese SOEs.  
During the five years before 2007, less than 50 percent of Chinese SOEs listed on 
domestic markets in the process of their privatizations. Especially in 2004 and 2005, 
this ratio was only 23.81% and 29.27%, respectively. A highly significant jump 
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happened after 2007. The percentage of domestic issuance increased from 42.53% in 
2007 to 68.33% in 2008. Then it remained high in the following six years. The “shift to 
domestic issuance” pattern is evident and clear among Chinese SOEs. Figure 2 Panel B 
shows the corresponding pattern for Chinese private-owned firms. We observe an 
obvious jump around 2006 and the ratio was relatively stable from 2006 to 2009. It 
requires more rigorous statistical tests to answer whether this shift to domestic issuance 
is the same as the one we observe for SOEs. We first follow equation (4) to test whether 
private firms still show higher probability of domestic listing after controlling for the 
impact of market absorptive capacity and other confounding variables. As displayed in 
Table 17, the results are significant no matter we use 2007 or 2008 as the dividing year. 
The probability to list in an overseas market is significantly reduced after 2007. 
We then use the DID technique to examine whether the shift was different for 
SOEs and private firms and what the differences are. The Probit model is described in 
equation (5). Our variable of interest is the interaction term. Table 18 shows the results. 
With 2007 as the dividing year, the interaction term has a significantly positive 
coefficient. It means that, after 2007, Chinese SOEs have relatively higher probability 
to choose overseas markets to issue new shares comparing to Chinese private firms. In 
other words, Chinese private firms have a more apparent shift to domestic issuance than 
SOEs since 2007. However, if we change the dividing year to 2008, the coefficient of 
the interaction term becomes insignificant. This indicates that Chinese SOEs and private 
firms have similar shift to domestic issuance patterns after 2008. Therefore, we believe 
the pattern difference is mainly concentrated in 2007 which is consistent with the curves 
shown in Figure 2. This result also supports our hypothesis 3a. Since private firms 
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operate more efficiently than SOEs and are more sensitive to policy changes, it explains 
why the shift appears earlier for private firms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We study Chinese SIPs from 1990 to 2013 and show that the pattern of 
percentage domestic issuance for Chinese SOEs experiences the discontinuity after 
2007. Overseas markets were the primary listing markets for Chinese SOEs if they had 
SIP before 2007, but this pattern has changed and Chinese domestic markets became 
attractive to SOEs when they needed to privatize in public markets after 2007. The 
reason for the discontinuity is complicated.  We create a variable (AC ratio) to proxy 
the market absorptive capacity and, using a Probit test, find that the rapid increase in 
absorptive capacity of Chinese financial markets is an important reason for the shift to 
domestic issuance after 2007. By using the propensity score matching, and showing that 
the Shanghai stock market’s development was affected by the policies, we reasonably 
illustrate the point that the shift to domestic issuance was caused by the policies which 
were promulgated by the Chinese government around 2007 to facilitate the 
development of capital markets and establish an international financial center in 
Shanghai. By comparing the SOE listing strategy with the private firm listing strategy, 
and employing the DID technique, we confirm that the Chinese government encourages 
SOEs to list domestically using policy tools, not administrative instructions. To 
summarize, we believe the discontinuity was caused by some combination of both 
improved market absorptive capacity and major policy initiatives. 
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Future researchers should investigate the relationship between changes in the 
Chinese political environment, and changes in SOEs’ listing strategies. Political need 
such as showing off national power or economic strength is generally considered as a 
determinant of overseas listing. However, in recent years, because of the adjustment in 
the Chinese Communist Party leadership and the intense discussion on the reform of 
Chinese political system, the Chinese government has become more pragmatic and self-
disciplined. The Chinese political environment has improved and this could change 

















Chapter 3: The Choice of Flotation Methods: Evidence from Chinese 
Seasoned Equity Offerings4 
 
1. Introduction 
The choice of equity flotation methods varies across different countries. In the 
United States, rights offerings dominated other public offering methods from 1933 to 
1955. But it was rarely used in the following two decades and almost disappeared since 
early 1980s. Firm commitment public offerings have replaced rights offerings and 
become the dominant equity flotation method in the recent years [Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992, 1995)]. In Britain, rights offerings were the only method for seasoned equity 
issuance prior to the mid-1980s. After that, placings became an alternative choice and 
were widely used by British firms [Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000)]. Our focus is 
Chinese market. Before 2005, there were only two flotation methods, rights offerings 
and public offerings. More than 90 percent of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in 
China were through rights offerings. In 2005, due to the preparation of Split Share 
Structure Reform, the market was almost closed down and only four public offerings 
were conducted in that year. After 2005, private placements were introduced as a new 
equity flotation method and rapidly became a popular way for Chinese companies to 
raise additional capital. With more than 90 percent of SEOs through private placements, 
it significantly dominated the other two methods in the last decade. In this study, we 
examine and analyze valuation effects of the three flotation methods, investigate the 
                                                 
4 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Weici Yuan. 
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flotation method selection mechanism, and address the possible reasons for the 
significant shift from rights offerings to private placements. 
With a sample of 3,652 SEOs through public offerings, rights offerings, and 
private placements by both private firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we first 
examine the valuation effect of each issuance method under a standard event study 
setting and compare our results with the existing literature. In a three-day event 
window, we find a -1.03% average abnormal return following public offerings and this 
result is consistent with the extensive findings in western markets [Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986), and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995)]. The 
average market reaction to rights offering announcements is much smaller but still 
negative (-0.38%). Although the reactions to both public and rights offerings have the 
same sign as the abnormal returns documented in U.S. and British markets, in terms of 
absolute value, the average excess returns in Chinese markets are more favorable. In 
terms of private placement announcements, we find a 1.33% excess return over the 
three-day window. This is consistent with the results documented by Abidin, Reddy, 
and Chen (2011) and Chen (2015). It seems that the introduction of private placement 
after 2005 gives Chinese firms an alternative choice to send favorable signals to the 
market and the shift to private placement pattern is a result of self-selection to 
differentiate good firms from bad ones.  
We take a further step to divide each of our public and rights offering samples 
into two subsamples based on whether the equity issuance was announced before or 
after 2005 and examine how the valuation effects of the two original flotation methods 
change after introducing private placement as a new flotation method. We find a 
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significant market reaction improvement for public offering announcements after 2005. 
The average excess returns over three different event windows change from 
significantly negative to either slightly positive or insignificant. There is no apparent 
change in market reactions to rights offering announcements after 2005. The abnormal 
returns are marginal negative but significant in both pre- and post-2005 periods. Taking 
the positive market reactions to private placement announcements into consideration, 
we believe that the private placement, as an alternative equity flotation method 
introduced after 2005, gives Chinese firms more options to convey information and 
high quality firms can better distinguish themselves from low quality ones by avoiding 
either public or rights offerings and choosing private placements. The positive market 
reactions to private placements explain the shift from rights offering to private 
placement to some extent.  
For rights offerings, we also check whether the take-up rate of existing 
shareholders affects the announcement period reactions. This take-up rate measures the 
percentage of newly issued shares purchased by existing shareholders. The median 
shareholder take-up rate in our sample is 54.9%. We find that the offerings with take-up 
rates greater than 54.9% have an average excess return which is 1% higher than the 
average excess return for offerings with take-up rates less than 54.9% over a three-day 
window. This result is consistent with the model prediction in Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992). For private placements, we use the blockholder take-up rate to measure the 
percentage of newly issued shares which are purchased by a firm’s blockholders. We 
find that the market reaction is more positive if a firm’s blockholders purchase more 
than 50% of the newly issued shares in a private placement. This might be explained by 
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the monitoring story proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). In our cross-sectional 
test, we show that the three-day average abnormal return is negatively related to the 
price discount of private placements. That means the market will negatively interpret 
the information if a firm’s issuing price for private investors is much lower than its 
market price. 
Besides examining the valuation effects, we also investigate the driving factors 
for the choice of equity flotation methods in China. We test three hypotheses to 
discover Chinese firms’ flotation method selection mechanism and attempt to explain 
the shift from rights offering before 2005 to private placement after 2005. We first test 
the information asymmetry story. Because of the asymmetric information between 
managers and investors, managers are considered to have information advantage to 
outside investors. Since managers act in the best interest of existing shareholders, they 
will publicly issue equity only if they believe the company is overvalued. For the 
undervalued firms with financial constraints, managers will choose to not issue equity 
and forgo positive NPV projects. This is called Myers and Majluf “underinvestment 
problem”. Hertzel and Smith (1993) propose that private placement can mitigate the 
underinvestment problem. Since private placement is only for a small group of 
investors, an undervalued firm can alleviate the information asymmetry by better 
communicating private information with investors through negotiations and convincing 
them that the firm is undervalued and has good prospects. The willingness of private 
placement investors to provide funds to the firm and the firm’s choice to forgo public 
offering release a positive signal to the market. So we hypothesize that a firm with a 
higher level of information asymmetry should have more incentive to choose private 
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placement and avoid public offering. We use the analyst coverage and stock price bid-
ask spread to measure a firm’s information asymmetry and employ the multinomial 
logistic model to estimate the marginal effect of information asymmetry on the 
probability of using each flotation method. Our results support the information 
asymmetry story. When a firm has a higher level of information asymmetry, its 
probability to select private placement will increase and the firm will be less likely to 
use public offering. The impact of information asymmetry on the marginal probability 
of selecting rights offering is statistically insignificant.  
Our second hypothesis is the ownership structure story. Public offering lowers 
ownership concentration because the issuance is for all public investors. Rights offering 
grants existing shareholders the rights to purchase additional shares proportionally. 
Since most of time the take-up rate is relatively high, the issuing firm’s ownership 
concentration is usually not changed significantly following rights offerings. By 
employing private placement, a firm issues a large block of shares to one or a few 
investors. This usually increases ownership concentration and may cause either positive 
or negative valuation effect. The positive market reaction can be explained by the 
monitoring hypothesis proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Wruck (1989). 
Since the placement is taken by a small number of active investors and there is usually a 
lock-up period for the new share purchasers, the investors have incentive to monitor 
management more efficiently which lowers the agency cost addressed in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and the probability of value-increasing takeovers is increased. In 
contrast, the managerial entrenchment story noted by Dann and DeAngelo (1988) and 
Wruck (1989) reveals the possible downside of private placement. Since private 
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placement is only for a small group of investors, managers have stronger influence on 
the issuing firm’s ownership structure. In order to entrench their control of the firm, 
managers may choose to issue shares to passive investors or the investors who have 
good relationships with the managers. In this case, private placement hurts firm value 
because it may aggravate possible agency problems and lower the possibility of 
favorable takeovers. This entrenchment story is empirically supported by both Wu 
(2004) and Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2007).  
We first test whether managers choose private placement to improve the 
monitoring from outside investors. We check whether firms with low ownership 
concentration are more likely to employ private placement. Both the percentage 
ownership of top five blockholders and the percentage ownership of institutional 
investors are used as measures of ownership concentration. The results from our 
multinomial logit mode show that the ownership concentration is not a decisive factor 
in a firm’s flotation method selection mechanism. To test the managerial entrenchment 
story, we examine whether firms with low insider ownership have greater incentive to 
use private placement. We embed insider ownership into our multinomial logit model 
and the results show that insider ownership is not an important factor affecting the 
selection of equity flotation methods. In addition, we follow the method used by Wruck 
(1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) and run a cross-sectional regression to check the 
relationship between Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and the change in 
ownership concentration. When we pool all of our private placement observations 
together, this relationship is not statistically significant. However, when we divide our 
entire sample into three groups based on their post-placement insider ownership, we 
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find that the relationship between CARs and ownership concentration change is 
negative in the group with small (below 5%) post-placement insider ownership and is 
positive in the groups with middle (5% to 25%) and high (above 25%) post-placement 
insider ownership. These results contradict the managerial entrenchment hypothesis but 
indicate that markets react positively to insider ownership increase when this ownership 
change leads managerial ownership to a dominant level which reduces the agency costs 
between managers and outside investors. Overall, our findings suggest that a firm’s 
ownership structure does not play an important role in the firm’s flotation method 
selection process. 
In the last hypothesis, we test the listing requirement story. In China, all equity 
issuing matters are governed by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and 
CSRC has strict listing requirements for different types of equity flotation methods. 
Among all miscellaneous provisions, we believe the variation of profitability 
requirements affects a firm’s choice of flotation methods. To implement rights offering 
or public offering, CSRC requires the issuing firm’s average Return on Equity (ROE) 
over the recent three fiscal years to be at least 6%. For private placements, there was a 
requirement of 10% minimum average ROE from 2002 to 2005. In that period, almost 
no private placement was employed. CSRC promulgated new ‘Regulations for the 
Issuance of Securities of Listed Companies’ and ‘Regulations of refinancing’ in 2006 to 
facilitate the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) and the previous minimum ROE 
requirement was repealed at the same period. We believe the preference for private 
placement after 2005 is partially caused by the low profitability requirement of private 
placement. The removal of ROE requirement gives the firms which don’t satisfy the 
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profitability requirements an alternative choice to raise external capital. To test our 
story, we use Return on Asset (ROA) and ROE as measures of firm profitability and 
add them into our multinomial logistic regression. We find that when a firm’s 
profitability is increased, the chance of using private placement will significantly 
decrease and the firm has greater probability to use public offerings. The marginal 
probability of picking rights offering is insignificantly different from zero. In addition, 
we check the profitability difference between the firms issuing equity before and after 
2005. Firms issuing equity after 2005 on average have significantly lower profitability 
than firms with equity issuance before 2005. This supports our story that private 
placement provides a chance for the firms with lower profitability to raise additional 
funds and also serves as a piece of evidence explaining the shift from rights offering to 
private placement.  
There is a large variation among the choices of equity flotation methods over 
different countries. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2013, 2017) and Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 
(2013) focus on the IPO activity in the U.S. They find that the number of IPOs by U.S. 
firms is significantly reduced after 2000 while non-U.S. firms increase their IPO 
activity in the same period. The choice of SEO method in different countries is also 
receiving more attention in the literature [Wu (2004) focus on the U.S., Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2005) focus on Sweden, Ginglinger, Matsoukis, and Riva (2013) focus on 
France, Slovin et al. (2000), Barnes and Walker (2006), Armitage (2010), and Capstaff 
and Fletcher (2011) focus on the U.K.]. In this study, we focus on China which is the 
second largest economy and has the most important emerging market in the world. This 
paper gives comprehensive description and analysis for seasoned equity offering 
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methods used in Chinese markets. We check valuation effects for different equity 
flotation methods and examine whether the market price reactions are consistent with 
finance theories and with the empirical findings in the U.S. and other western countries. 
More importantly, we study the determinants affecting flotation method choice in 
China. We test the traditional information asymmetry, monitoring, and managerial 
entrenchment stories with a new comprehensive Chinese dataset. Besides that, due to 
the strict equity issuance approval process in China, we propose a listing requirement 
story to explain Chinese firms’ flotation method choices and provide positive evidence 
supporting our hypothesis. In previous literature, the flotation method choice has only 
been studied between two methods [public offering vs. private placement by Wu (2004) 
and Abidin et al. (2012); rights offering vs. public placing by Slovin et al. (2000), 
Barnes and Walker (2006), Capstaff and Fletcher (2011), Dang and Yang (2013), and 
Ginglinger et al. (2013); rights offering vs. private placement by Cronqvist and Nilsson 
(2005)] with a probit model. In our paper, we use a multinomial logit model to assess 
how the change of each factor may affect the choice of three alternative equity flotation 
methods simultaneously. This allows us to evaluate the sensitivity of the each method 
towards different decisive factors. In the end, we give an attempt to explain the issuance 
method shift from rights offering to private equity placement around 2005.   
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the equity 
flotation methods used in Chinese markets and presents the usage frequency of each 
method over the past 24 years. Section 3 states the testable hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the data sample and explain the empirical methodologies. Section 5 shows the 
results and Section 6 concludes the paper.   
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2. Introduction of Equity Flotation Methods in China  
Rights offering, public offering, and private placement are the three most 
commonly used equity flotation methods in China nowadays. Chinese listed companies 
have raised almost five trillion Chinese yuan (RMB) through the three types of 
seasoned equity offerings by the end of 2015. However, the three methods did not 
emerge at the same time and the preference for each method changes over time. Table 
19 provides a comparison of the usage of three flotation methods. As shown in Panel A, 
rights offering is the first seasoned equity issuance method used in China. It grants a 
firm’s existing shareholders a priority to subscribe the firm’s newly issued shares 
proportionally at a discounted price. Over the past 24 years, 1,004 rights offerings have 
been accomplished which brought 535.54 billion RMB to Chinese listed firms. Public 
offering seems like the most unpopular SEO method in China. In a public offering 
process, the issuing company issues new shares to non-specific public investors 
including both existing and new shareholders. Usually the new share purchasers are 
relatively small and diverse and the issuing firm manager has little influence on their 
firm’s post-issuance ownership structure. The first public offering in our sample was 
conducted in 1998 and since then there were only 186 public offerings being carried 
through and a total of 325.80 billion RMB had been raised by 2015. Private placement 
is a type of non-public offering and is only for a few of specific investors (the maximum 
number of investors in one private placement is ten). The issuing firm manager might 
affect the composition of potential private placing investors and have a stronger 
influence on their firm’s post-placement ownership structure. Private placement has 
looser profitability requirements than either public or rights offering. Although the first 
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private placement in our sample was in 1999, we only observe sporadic private 
placements in early times (two in 1999, one in 2001, and one in 2002) and it had not 
been widely used until 2006. The prevalence of private placement started in 2006. From 
then on, Chinese firms have raised 4.05 trillion RMB through 2,458 placements which 
makes private placement become the most dominant equity flotation method used in 
China in terms of number of issuance and total capital raised.  
Panel B and C of Table 19 show the percentage usage of each method. We find 
that the popularity of each flotation method changes over time. But the patterns are 
similar regardless the percentages are calculated by number of issuance or capital 
raised. In the ten years from 1992 to 2001, rights offering was the primary equity 
flotation method in China. Even after the appearance of public offering in 1998, rights 
offering was always in a dominant position and more than 80 percent of seasoned equity 
offerings were through rights offerings. The proportion of public offering had increased 
significantly after 2002. Although it was still behind rights offering in terms of number 
of issuance in the period of 2002 to 2004, more than 60 percent of total capital was 
raised through public offering. 2005 is a special year in our sample. Chinese 
government started the SSSR in that year with the purpose to eliminate the difference of 
circulation system between tradable and non-tradable shares. To prepare for this reform, 
the equity market was almost shut down. We only observe four seasoned equity 
offerings in 2005 and all of them were through public offerings. The private placement 
age started in 2006 when CSRC promulgated new ‘Regulations for the Issuance of 
Securities of Listed Companies’ and ‘Regulations of refinancing’ removing the 
minimum profitability requirements for non-public offering which were continuously 
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enforced from 2002 to 2005. The usage of private placement increased dramatically to 
almost 85 percent counted by number of issuance and to 89 percent counted by capital 
raised in 2006. And in the following years till 2015, private placement significantly 
dominated the other two equity flotation methods with more than 80 percent usage on 
average no matter which method we use to calculate the percentages. These popularity 
patterns can also be observed in Figure 3. Overall, private placement is the most 
frequently used equity flotation method in China while public offering is the most 
reluctantly used. The usage of rights offering is somewhere in the middle. However, 
when we check the preference of each method over time, we find that rights offering 
was the leading flotation method in Chinese equity market before 2005 and there was an 
apparent shift from rights offering to private placement after 2005. Since then, private 
placement became the new primary flotation method and was pervasively used by 
Chinese listed firms. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
Besides examining valuation effects of the three equity flotation methods, 
another important purpose of this study is to explain why a firm’s manager chooses one 
flotation method over the others and then address the underlying causes for the shift 
from rights offering to private placement. In this section, we describe some potential 
factors which could possibly affect a manager’s decision about flotation method choice.  
3.1. Information Asymmetry Hypothesis  
Myers and Majluf (1984) point out an “underinvestment problem” for the firms 
with undervalued outstanding shares. Due to the information asymmetry between 
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managers and outside investors, managers have information advantage comparing to 
investors and investors learn new information from the signals sent by managers. In 
their model, managers act in the best interest of existing shareholders and they will 
choose to issue new equity only if they believe their firm’s stock is overvalued because 
this decision can help existing shareholders take advantage of new investors. Therefore, 
whenever a firm issues new shares, the market will read it as a negative signal because 
investors believe the firm is overvalued. For undervalued firms with financial 
constraints, to avoid sending negative signals to the market, they are reluctant to issue 
new shares and choose to forgo positive NPV projects. Hertzel and Smith (1993) 
propose that private placement is a solution to the Myers and Majluf underinvestment 
problem. Since private placement is only for a small number of investors, firm 
managers can better communicate information with private placement investors and 
convince them that their firm is undervalued and has good prospects. Managers’ 
decision to relinquish public offering and investors’ decision to provide fund through 
private placing both send a positive signal to the market and cause positive valuation 
effect. Therefore, private placement plays a role to reduce information asymmetry and 
mitigate the underinvestment problem. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) develop a 
model to explain a firm’s going-public decision. In their model, there is a trade-off 
between information production costs and bargaining power against entrepreneur. When 
the information asymmetry is high between managers and outside investors, 
information production costs for outsiders are relatively high. If the firm chooses to go 
public and issue shares to a large number of outside investors, the higher information 
production costs will be duplicated and borne by the issuing firm. Therefore, in this 
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situation, the firm should choose private placement to lower the aggregated information 
production costs. Empirically, Wu (2004) study the choice between public offering and 
private placement with US public firms. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) study the choice 
between rights offering and private placement with Swedish public firms. Both articles 
show that a high information asymmetry level motivates firms to choose private 
placement. Based on the previous literature, we hypothesize that with higher 
information asymmetry, Chinese firms have more incentive (larger probability) to 
choose private placements and less incentive (smaller probability) to choose either 
public offerings or rights offerings. Since existing shareholders might have better 
knowledge about their firm’s true value than outside new investors, the information 
production costs for existing shareholders are reasonably smaller than the costs for new 
investors. We believe when the information asymmetry level is increased, the marginal 
probability decrease for rights offerings should be lower than the marginal probability 
decrease for public offerings. Or in other words, rights offering is more preferable than 
public offering.  
3.2. Ownership Structure Hypothesis  
Three equity flotation methods may cause different ownership structure changes 
following the issuance. Public offering usually decreases ownership concentration since 
the issuance is for small public investors. Rights offering gives existing shareholders a 
privilege to purchase additional shares and normally has trivial influence on post-
issuance ownership structure. Private placement increases ownership concentration by 
placing a large portion of equity to one single or a small group of investors. We believe 
the different influences on ownership structure may affect the choice of different 
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flotation methods. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Wruck (1989) propose a monitoring 
story. Private placement in China is limited to no more than ten investors and each 
investor holds a large block of stock with a 12 to 36-month lock-up period. Since the 
private placement investors’ proportion of equity is relatively high and they cannot 
trade the purchased shares within the lock-up period, they have incentive to monitor the 
management with expectation to lower agency cost and increase firm value [Karpoff, 
Lee, and Masulis (2013)]. Therefore, we hypothesize that private placement leads to an 
increase in ownership concentration and Chinese listed firms with low ownership 
concentration have larger probability to use private placement in order to attract outside 
institutional investors to enhance the monitoring effect. Nevertheless, we also consider 
the managerial entrenchment story noted by Dann and DeAngelo (1988) and Wruck 
(1989). Private placement investors are not randomly selected. Managers may have 
significant influence in the selection process. Due to the selfishness of managers, they 
have incentive to entrench and strengthen their control of the company. Therefore, they 
are motivated to select passive investors or the investors who are willing to stand on the 
same side with the managers in voting events. These private placement investors will 
not increase monitoring to management. On the contrary, the firm value will be hurt due 
to the potential aggravated agency problems and the decreased possibility of favorable 
takeovers. Furthermore, Wu (2004) suggests a managerial self-dealing story stating that 
managers have propensity to expropriate shareholders by purchasing new shares at large 
discounted prices through private placements to transfer wealth from existing 
shareholders to managers. Their incentive is particularly strong if managers have small 
initial stakes. Thus, we hypothesize that private placement may be motivated by 
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managerial self-dealing incentive. Listed firms with low managerial ownership tend to 
have a higher probability to use private placement.  
3.3. Listing Requirement Hypothesis  
In China, the issuance of new shares of listed firms is regulated by CSRC. To be 
qualified to issue new shares, listed firms are required to satisfy a series of stringent 
conditions. Before 2006, seasoned equity offerings were mainly in the forms of public 
offerings and rights offerings. Among all kinds of legal, operational, and listing 
requirements, profitability condition was a critical factor affecting the approval of a 
firm’s new share issuance request. CSRC required the issuing firms to show a minimum 
of 6% weighted average ROE over the last three years before the offerings. This 
profitability requirement applied to all of the three flotation methods although private 
placement was rarely used in that period. In 2002, CSRC even made the equity issuance 
requirements more stringent and increased the profitability bar from 6% to 10% 
weighted average ROE. This requirement limited low profitability firms’ ability to raise 
funds from capital markets. However, in 2006, CSRC promulgated new ‘Regulations 
for the Issuance of Securities of Listed Companies’ and ‘Regulations of refinancing’ to 
facilitate the SSSR which started in 2005. In the new regulations, for non-public 
offerings (private placements), the maximum number of private placement investors is 
ten, the offering price should not be less than 90% of the average market value, and 
there is a 12 to 36-month lock-up period for the new share purchasers. However, the 
profitability requirement was abolished and firms could apply for private placements 
even if they experienced a loss in the past years. These new regulations reduced the 
difficulty of refinancing and made private placement an alternative option to raise funds 
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for the firms which did not meet the profitability requirements to offer publicly. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that listed firms with lower profitability tend to choose 
private placement to raise capital since there is no profitability requirement and the 
issuing procedure is simpler and quicker.  
 
4. Data and Methodologies 
We collect equity flotation data for Chinese listed firms from the WIND 
database. In total, we have 3,652 issuances covering all three flotation methods over the 
period of 1992 to 2015. Among them, 186 issuances are public offerings, 1,004 
issuances are rights offerings, and the rest 2,462 belong to private placements. Our 
issuers include both private firms and SOEs. Relevant stock price information and firm 
financial data are collected from the Chinese Stock Market & Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. Ownership information is collected from S&P Capital IQ database.   
We employ a standard event study procedure to check the valuation effects of 
three flotation methods over the announcement period. The announcement day is set as 
day 0. We construct a three-day event window from day -1 to day 1, a five-day event 
window from day -2 to day 2, and a seven-day event window from day -3 to day 3. We 
obtain daily stock return data for each firm from the CSMAR and estimate our market 
model over the period of day -270 to day -21. In our market model estimation process, a 
unique problem regarding the market return arises due to a special feature of China’s 
stock markets that there exist two stock exchanges: Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Throughout this work, we use the index for the former 
(Shanghai Composite Index) to compute the market returns in that the market size of 
72 
Shanghai Stock Exchange is by far greater than that of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 
that we can use a single market return as opposed to two. Nevertheless, we have 
experimented with two market returns for the two stock exchanges respectively and 
constructed a comprehensive market return which is a weighted average of the market 
returns in the two stock exchanges. The results are largely unchanged. Abnormal return 
is defined as the difference between the actual return and the predicted return from our 
estimated market model. We report cumulative abnormal returns which are the sum of 
daily abnormal returns over the event windows.  
In determining the driving factors of the choice of flotation methods, we apply a 
multinomial logit model. Multinomial Logit, also known as multinomial logistic 
regression, generalizes the Logit model to problems with more than two choices that 
cannot be ordered in a meaningful way. In our model setup with three flotation 
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However, in order for the entire model to be identifiable, one of the outcomes 
has to be treated as the baseline category and the parameters specific to this category are 
set to zero. This exercise also guarantees the sum of the probabilities of the three 
outcomes to be 1, for any individual i. Without loss of generality, we let the first 
category be the baseline outcome. Setting βj = 0 leads to the following equations, which 





















 ,      j=3                          (11) 
There are two commonly used ways of calculating marginal effects. The 
traditional practice is to compute marginal effects while setting all variables to their 
means. It represents the response of an average individual to a change in a predictor, 
holding everything else constant. An alternative approach, which has been gaining 
popularity recently, is to take the average of the marginal effects evaluated at each 
sample data point. It shows the mean response of all individuals in the sample. In most 
cases, the results based on these two methods are quantitatively similar and we will only 
show the latter in the results table.  
We consider a variety of firm-specific characteristics in our analysis including 
firms’ size, ROA, growth rate of sales revenue, current ratio, number of analysts, 
percentage shares owned by institutions, percentage shares held by top five 
blockholders, bid-ask spread, price discount, and the size of refinancing. All variables 
pertaining to firm characteristics are lagged by one year to avoid contemporaneous 
endogeneity and to take care of the fact that a decision to refinance was made before it 
was actually implemented. Given that China’s SSSR in 2005 strongly affected a firm’s 
refinancing choice, we also include a dummy variable in the regression indicating 
whether a SEO took place before or after 2005 to control for the policy changes. 
As a general rule, the marginal effects of any covariate on the three flotation 
methods sum to zero. This is inherent in the fact that the probability that at least one of 
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the outcomes occurs is always 100%. Any violation of this zero sum rule in our result 
table is purely due to rounding errors. 
 
5. Results 
Table 20 shows the definitions of all variables in this study. Table 21 presents 
the descriptive statistics of relevant variables.  
5.1. Valuation effects of three equity flotation methods 
Stock price reactions around issuance announcement periods are presented in 
Table 22. We report excess returns in 3-day, 5-day, and 7-day window. From Panel A, 
we find market reaction for public offering is significantly negative. The 3 to 7-day 
average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are from -1.09% to -2.15%. The average 
CARs for rights offering are also significantly negative but smaller in terms of absolute 
value. The 3 to 7-day average CARs are from -0.39% to -1.55%. It indicates that public 
offering is more unfavorable than rights offering. This pattern is similar to the one 
observed in the U.S. markets although the degree of negative market reaction is 
apparently lower in China. The less negative wealth effect of rights offering explains its 
dominant position before the SSSR. When we check the market reactions to private 
placement announcements, we exclude the observations with more than 30 days of 
trading suspension after the announcements of private placement. These observations 
may bias our results since CAR catches not only the effect of private placement, but 
also the influence of some other information generated in the suspension period. We 
find significantly positive market reactions for private placement announcements in all 
of the three event windows. The 3 to 7-day average CARs are from 1.33% to 3.24% 
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which are largely consistent with the findings in most of the empirical studies 
conducted in western markets [Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), and Hertzel, 
Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002)]. It indicates that the introduction of private 
placement after 2005 gives Chinese firms an alternative choice to send favorable signals 
to the market and the shift to private placement pattern is a result of self-selection to 
differentiate good firms from bad ones. Since private placement is widely used after 
2005, in Panel B, we check whether the market reactions for both public and rights 
offerings are changed from pre-2005 to post-2005 period due to the increased popularity 
of private placement. We find that there is no apparent market reaction change for rights 
offering. It is still slightly but significantly negative after 2005. However, the market 
reaction for public offering is changed from largely negative to insignificantly different 
from zero or even significantly positive. In the pre-2005 period, public offerings were 
highly unfavorable with average CARs more than -3.25% in all event windows. After 
2005, public offering has a significantly positive average CAR (0.88%) over the 3-day 
event window and the average CARs are insignificantly different from zero over the 5 
or 7-day window. Our results before 2005 are similar to the pattern observed in the U.S. 
markets. Public offering is more unfavorable than rights offering in terms of valuation 
effects. However, the pattern we find after 2005 is reversed. Rights offering becomes 
the most unfavorable one among the three methods. A more favorable market reaction 
is generated by avoiding rights offering and selecting private placement. In addition, we 
also check whether the shareholder take-up rate affects the market reactions to rights 
offering announcements. Results are shown in Panel C. The take-up rate measures the 
proportion of newly issued shares purchased by existing shareholders. The median take-
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up rate in our sample is 54.9%. We find that the market reaction is significantly 
negative when the existing shareholder take-up rate is below our sample median. When 
the take-up rate is higher than the median and most of the new shares are purchased by 
existing shareholders, the market reaction is more favorable (insignificantly different 
from zero). In Panel D, we show the impact of blockholder take-up rate on the market 
reaction to private placement announcements. We find that the market reaction is more 
positive if a firm’s existing blockholders purchase more than 50% of the total private 
placement shares.   
5.2. Cross-sectional regression results 
In our cross-sectional tests, we regress CARs of each flotation method on firm 
and issuance characteristics in order to examine what factors are relevant to the 
valuation effects. All cross-sectional tests are over the period of 2005 to 2015 in which 
the three flotation methods were all available on Chinese markets. Due to the limited 
observations for public and rights offerings, the results are less conclusive and not 
reported. However, we can still tell that the rights offering take-up rate is positively 
related to stock price reaction which is consistent with the event study results. The high 
take-up rate mitigates the adverse selection problem described by Eckbo and Masulis 
and is positively valued by the market. Table 23 shows the cross-sectional results for 
private placement only. We find that there is a significantly negative relationship 
between price discount and CARs. This result indicates that private placements with 
large price discounts send a negative signal to the market. There are two possible 
explanations for the market’s negative interpretation. 1) Investors consider a large price 
discount as a sign that the manager expects stock price to decrease after the placement. 
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2) A large price discount indicates potential managerial self-dealing problem in which 
wealth is transferred from existing shareholders to managers by privately placing a large 
portion of shares to managers at a large discount. In addition, we check whether the 
change of ownership concentration affects market reactions following Wruck (1989) in 
order to verify the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. We partition our whole sample 
into three groups based on the post-placement insider percentage ownership. Our results 
are largely different from the ones reported in Wruck (1989). In the group with low 
level of post-placement insider ownership (0 to 5%), CARs are negatively related to 
changes in ownership concentration. However, in the groups with middle (5% to 25%) 
or high (above 25%) level of insider ownership, CARs are positively related to changes 
in ownership concentration. Therefore, the managerial entrenchment story cannot be 
justified by our data from Chinese markets. Contrarily, our results precisely suggest that 
investors believe that the increase of insider ownership aligns interests between 
managers and outside investors which mitigates the agency costs noted by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). 
5.3. Multinomial logistic regression results  
In this section, we identify the factors which affect a manager’s choice of 
flotation methods. Table 24 presents the marginal effects of the explanatory variables 
on the probability of choosing each of the three flotation methods. The results are in 
percentage terms and indicate the changes in probability associated with one unit 
change in the corresponding predictor. We do not report the coefficients of the original 
multinomial logistic regression in that they represent the logarithm of the 
relative probability of one outcome over the baseline outcome, which is difficult to 
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interpret, and that the results depend on the choice of the baseline outcome. By contrast, 
marginal effects are available for all categories of the dependent variable and are 
independent of the choice of the baseline outcome.  
In order to test our first hypothesis, we use number of analysts and average bid-
ask spread over the last five trading days prior to the announcement date to measure 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. The marginal effects 
of number of analysts on the probabilities of private placement and public offering are 
reported as -0.72% and 0.83% respectively. It means that when a firm is followed by 
one more analyst, its probability of choosing private placement is decreased by 0.72% 
and its probability of choosing public offering is increased by 0.83%. The marginal 
effect on rights offering is insignificantly different from zero. When a firm is followed 
by more analysts, the information asymmetry level is lower. This result implies that 
firms with higher level of information asymmetry tend to select private placements and 
avoid public offerings. The probability of using rights offering might still increase, but 
this increase is not statistically significant. Bid-ask spread is positively related to 
information asymmetry. Our result shows that when the spread is increased by one 
percent, the probability of choosing private placement is increased by 0.2% at 1% 
significance level, the probability of choosing public offering is decreased by 0.16%, 
and the probability of choosing rights offering is decreased by 0.04%. The marginal 
probabilities on both public offering and rights offering are not statistically significant. 
Our findings support our first hypothesis by showing that Chinese firms are incentivized 
to select private placement and avoid public offering when they have relatively high 
information asymmetry level. The probability of using rights offering can go either way, 
79 
but is not statistically significant. It suggests that rights offering is better than public 
offering, but worse than private placement when information asymmetry level is high.  
In our second hypothesis, we try to investigate whether the ownership 
concentration or the level of managerial ownership may have impacts on a manager’s 
choice of equity flotation methods. We use the total percentage ownership of top 5 
shareholders and the percentage ownership of insiders to measure ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership respectively. We find that the marginal effects 
on all of the three flotation methods are insignificantly different from zero. This 
indicates that ownership structure is not a crucial determinant in the mechanism of 
flotation methods selection. As a supplementary test for the monitoring hypothesis, we 
check the changes of ownership concentration for all of the three methods and results 
are reported in Table 25. We first use the ownership of top 5 blockholders to represent 
ownership concentration. There is no significant change of ownership concentration 
following either public or rights offerings. However, the mean and median ownership 
concentration show significant increase following private placements which is 
consistent with our monitoring hypothesis. Since institutional investors are considered 
to be the group with strong monitoring incentive and power, we further check the 
changes of institutional ownership following the three types of equity issuance. The 
results are similar to what we find with top 5 blockholder ownership. The institutional 
ownership change following public or rights offerings are still insignificant. We 
consistently find positive post-private placement institutional ownership change and the 
magnitude of ownership increase is larger when we use institutional ownership instead 
of ownership of top 5 blockholders. These results indicate that private placements 
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indeed increase firms’ ownership concentration and enhance the monitoring effects by 
placing large blocks of shares to institutional investors.  
In the last part, we examine the impact of profitability prior to an equity 
issuance on a firm’s choice of flotation methods. As we stated in our third hypothesis, 
firms have tendency to choose private placement since it doesn’t have profitability 
requirement and is more flexible. In our multinomial logit model, we use ROE as a 
proxy of profitability and find negative marginal effect (-0.21%) on private placement 
and positive marginal effect (0.17%) on public offering. Both are statistically significant 
at 5% level. This result implies that when a firm’s ROE is reduced by 1%, this firm’s 
probability to choose private placement will be 0.21% higher and its probability to 
choose public offering will decrease by 0.17%. The marginal effect on rights offering is 
not significant which means that profitability is not an important factor affecting the 
choice of rights offering. Our results are robust when we replace ROE with Return on 
Asset (ROA) or Return on Sales (ROS). We consider our results as the evidence 
supporting our third hypothesis.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we compare three major equity flotation methods commonly used 
by listed firms in China and document a preference shift from rights offering to private 
placement. We find negative valuation effects for both public and rights offerings 
although public offering is more unfavorable. These negative valuation effects are 
statistically significant but smaller than the effects documented in western markets in 
terms of absolute value. The valuation effect of private placement in China is 
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significantly positive which is consistent with the evidence found in western markets. 
This positive market reaction to private placement announcement suggests a signaling 
story to explain the switch from rights offering to private placement after 2005. We 
further investigate the flotation method selection mechanism and identify the 
determinants affecting a manager’s flotation method choice. We confirm the 
information asymmetry hypothesis by claiming that the chance of choosing private 
placement will be higher and the probability of choosing public offering will decrease if 
firms have higher level of information asymmetry. We do not find solid evidence 
indicating an impact of ownership structure on a manager’s choice of flotation methods. 
We find that a firm’s pre-issuance profitability is negatively related to the probability of 
choosing private placement but positively related to the probability of using public 
offering. The removal of profitability requirement for private placement in 2006 
provides a flexible and convenient option for Chinese listed firms to raise external 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Sample Distribution by Year 
 
This table shows my sample distribution over the period of 2006 to 2015. Firms owned by the 
central government are reported separately from firms owned by local governments. I include 














 Central Government Owned Local Government Owned 
Year No. of PPPs Capital Raised (bil 
RMB) 
No. of PPPs Capital Raised (bil RMB) 
2006 7 11.9 15 14.9 
2007 21 30.5 51 106.7 
2008 10 17.8 31 47.7 
2009 22 45.8 31 85.3 
2010 23 38.5 47 123.6 
2011 17 41.0 49 133.1 
2012 27 81.2 36 83.8 
2013 43 68.3 60 128.8 
2014 37 81.5 74 153.0 
2015 47 182.9 109 311.1 
Total 254 599.5 503 1188.3 
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Table 2. Covariates Balance Check 
 
This table makes a comparison of pre-privatization performance between treated sample and 
control sample. Under each performance variable, the mean of 3-year averages immediately 
before privatizations is reported. The control group is generated using Mahalanobis metric 
matching with sales and ROS as matching variables. P-value and t-statistic are reported to show 































Covariate Treated Control t-statistic P-value 
Real Sales (bil RMB) 2.6 2.6 0.08 0.94 
Firm size (log (bil RMB)) 0.28 0.23 0.39 0.70 
Growth of sales (%) 79.41 52.01 0.80 0.42 
ROA 3.41 3.65 0.23 0.82 
ROE 3.82 2.19 0.64 0.53 
ROS 5.34 5.20 0.13 0.90 
Capital Expenditure (mm 
RMB) 
539.12 609.82 0.42 0.67 
Turnover 0.65 0.74 1.59 0.11 
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Table 3. Comparison of Market Reactions to Private Placement Privatizations 
 
This table shows market reactions to the privatization plan announcements of firms with central 
and local government ownerships. Market reaction is measured by the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR). “Whole sample” means that CARs are calculated based on the entire sample. 
“<30 days” means that CARs are calculated based on the entire sample excluding PPPs with 
stock suspensions for more than 30 trading days. In panel A, CGOEs and LGOEs are not 
matched. Difference column shows the simple market reaction difference between the two types 
of firms. In panel B, CGOEs and LGOEs are matched using Mahalanobis metric matching. 1:1, 
2:1, and 3:1 nearest neighbor matching are employed and Sales and ROS are the matching 
variables. The numbers reported in this panel represent the differences in cumulative abnormal 
returns (%) between CGOEs and LGOEs. Being owned by the central government is regarded 
the “treatment” and a positive result represents a higher average cumulative abnormal return for 
firms owned by the central government, and vice versa. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
























-1 to 1 whole sample 2.01*** 4.74*** -2.72 0.43 
-2 to 2 whole sample 4.53*** 7.10*** -2.56 0.46 
-3 to 3 whole sample 5.85*** 8.17*** -2.33 0.50 
-1 to 1 <30 days 1.21*** 0.79** 0.42 0.43 
-2 to 2 <30 days 2.56*** 2.09*** 0.47 0.51 
-3 to 3 <30 days 2.99*** 2.67*** 0.32 0.69 
Panel B Difference in Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%) 
Sample (Matched) 1 Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors 3 Nearest Neighbors 
-1 to 1 whole sample 1.37 1.61 1.84* 
-2 to 2 whole sample 2.30* 2.40* 2.53** 
-3 to 3 whole sample 2.82* 2.92** 2.88** 
-1 to 1 < 30 days 0.47 0.48 0.34 
-2 to 2 < 30 days 0.55 0.57 0.32 
-3 to 3 < 30 days 0.26 0.10 -0.12 
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Table 4. Post-Privatization Performance Changes 
 
This table shows the pre- and post-privatization performance for CGOEs and LGOEs 
separately. The first column includes all performance variables. “Before” columns show the 
mean of pre-privatization 3-year averages of each performance variable. “After” columns show 
the mean of post-privatization 3-year averages of each performance variable. “Difference” 
columns capture the post-privatization performance changes. Only the significance level of 














 Central Government Owned Local Government Owned 
Performance Variable Before After Difference Before After Difference 
Output       
Real Sales (bil RMB) 2.65 4.99 2.34*** 2.06 4.48 2.42*** 
Real Net Profits (bil RMB) 0.17 0.44 0.27*** 0.13 0.34 0.23*** 
Profitability        
ROS 5.34 5.32 -0.02 4.57 6.53 1.96 
EBIT/Sales 5.41 5.32 -0.09 4.82 7.14 2.32 
Capital Investment       
Capital Expenditures/Sales  0.18 0.14 -0.04 0.21 0.17 -0.04 
Capital Expenditures/Assets  0.08 0.05 -0.03*** 0.11 0.06 -0.05*** 
Operating Efficiency       
Sales per Employee (mm 
RMB) 
2.02 1.86 -0.16 2.86 2.97 0.11 
Net Profit per Employee 
(mm RMB) 
0.17 0.13 -0.04 0.33 0.27 -0.06 
Turnover 0.65 0.74 0.09*** 0.68 0.76 0.08*** 
Leverage       
Debt to Assets 0.55 0.53 -0.02 0.57 0.54 -0.03*** 
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Table 5. Comparison of Post-Privatization Performance Changes 
 
This table shows the comparison results of post-privatization performance changes between 
CGOEs and LGOEs. The first column shows all performance variables compared in this test. 
Mahalanobis metric matching is employed. “No Restriction” means that CGOEs and LGOEs 
are matched on sales and ROS only. “Same Year” means that CGOEs and LGOEs are matched 
on sales, ROS, and year. “Same Industry” means that CGOEs and LGOEs are matched on sales, 
ROS, and industry. In each column, the numbers represent the results from 1:1, 2:1, and 3:1 
matching, respectively. Being owned by the central government is regarded the “treatment” and 
a positive result indicates a higher value for the firms owned by the central government, and 











Performance Variable No Restriction Same Year Same Industry 
Output    
Real Sales (bil RMB) 0.71|0.21|0.45 0.93|1.13*|0.80 -0.16|0.07|0.40 
Real Net Profits (bil RMB) 0.08*|0.10**|0.12*** 0.14**|0.13**|0.10 0.08*|0.08**|0.08** 









Capital Investment    
Capital Expenditures/Sales  0.03|0.04|0.02 0.11*|0.13|0.13* 0.11|0.06|0.04 
Capital Expenditures/Assets  0.01|0.02|0.02 0.02|0.02|0.03 0.00|0.00|0.00 
Operating Efficiency    
Sales per Employee (mm 
RMB) 
0.18|-0.20|-0.21 -0.28|0.17|0.39 -0.29|-0.22|-0.07 









Leverage    
Debt to Assets 0.02|0.01|0.01 0.00|0.01|0.01 0.01|0.02|0.02 
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Table 6. Regression Analysis on the Different Impacts between Central and Local 
Government Ownerships 
 
This table shows the results of regressions. The dependent variables are the changes in 3-year 
averages of performance variables before and after privatizations. The variable of interest is 
Central. It is a dummy variable and equals 1 if a firm is owned by the central government. 
Control variables include pre-privatization 3-year average real sales, ROS, ROA, sales growth 
rate, current ratio, turnover, and leverage. I only report the coefficients of Central in this table. 











Performance Variable Coefficient of Central Standard Deviation 
Output   
Real Sales (bil RMB) 0.47 0.50 
Real Net Profits (bil RMB) 0.10** 0.04 







Capital Investment   
Capital Expenditures/Sales  0.04 0.03 
Capital Expenditures/Assets  0.03** 0.01 
Operating Efficiency   
Sales per Employee (mm RMB) 0.06 0.30 







Leverage   
Debt to Assets 0.00 0.01 
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Table 7. Comparison of Post-Privatization Performance Changes by Propensity 
Score Matching 
 
This table shows the comparison results of post-privatization performance changes between 
CGOEs and LGOEs. The first column shows all performance variables compared in this test. 
Propensity score matching is employed. “No Restriction” means that CGOEs and LGOEs are 
matched on sales, ROS, sales growth rate, leverage, and turnover. “Same Year” means that 
CGOEs and LGOEs are matched on sales, ROS, sales growth rate, leverage, turnover, and year. 
“Same Industry” means that CGOEs and LGOEs are matched on sales, ROS, sales growth rate, 
leverage, turnover, and industry. In each column, the numbers represent the results from 1:1, 
2:1, and 3:1 matching, respectively. Being owned by the central government is regarded the 
“treatment” and a positive result indicates a higher value for the firms owned by the central 



















Outcome Variable No Restriction Same Year Same Industry 
Output    
Real Sales (bil RMB) 0.57|0.65|0.42 0.46|0.75|0.38 0.86*|0.20|0.35 
Real Net Profits (bil RMB) 0.12***|0.11*|0.11* 0.07|0.10|0.07 0.07|0.07*|0.08* 









Capital Investment    
Capital Expenditures/Sales  0.04|0.08|0.07 0.03|0.13*|0.16** -0.01|0.01|0.02 
Capital Expenditures/Assets  0.02|0.02|0.02 0.00|0.01|0.02 0.00|-0.01|-0.01 
Operating Efficiency    
Sales per Employee (mm RMB) -0.02|0.20|-0.32 -0.88|0.23|-0.10 -0.46|-1.24|-0.81 









Leverage    
Debt to Assets -0.02|-0.01|-0.01 0.03|0.01|0.01 0.02|0.02|0.01 
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Table 8. Comparison of Post-Privatization Performance Changes between SASAC 
Supervised CGOEs and LGOEs 
 
This table shows the comparison results of post-privatization performance changes between 
SASAC CGOEs and LGOEs. The first column shows all performance variables compared in 
this test. Mahalanobis metric matching is employed. “No Restriction” means that SASAC 
CGOEs and LGOEs are matched on sales and ROS only. “Same Year” means that SASAC 
CGOEs and LGOEs are matched on sales, ROS, and year. “Same Industry” means that SASAC 
CGOEs and LGOEs are matched on sales, ROS, and industry. In each column, the numbers 
represent the results from 1:1, 2:1, and 3:1 matching, respectively. Being owned by the central 
government is regarded the “treatment” and a positive result indicates a higher value for the 
firms owned by the central government, and vice versa. ***, **, and * denote significance at 




















Outcome Variable No Restriction Same Year Same Industry 
Output    
Real Sales (bil RMB) 0.93|0.49|0.81 0.45|0.99|0.64 0.23|0.36|0.75 
Real Net Profits (bil RMB) 0.10*|0.13**|0.14*** 0.14**|0.13**|0.10 0.10*|0.10**|0.10** 









Capital Investment    
Capital Expenditures/Sales  0.06|0.04|0.02 0.09|0.08|0.07 0.13|0.07|0.04 
Capital Expenditures/Assets  0.03*|0.03**|0.02** 0.02*|0.03|0.04* 0.01|0.01|0.01 
Operating Efficiency    
Sales per Employee (mm RMB) 0.33|-0.41|-0.26 -1.09|-0.19|-0.30 -0.53|-0.48|1.87| 









Leverage    
Debt to Assets 0.03|0.02|0.02 0.01|0.01|0.01 0.01|0.01|0.02 
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Table 9. Statistical Description of the Whole Share-Issue Privatization Sample 
 
This table shows the statistical description of our Chinese SIP sample.  In the second column, 
we report the total number of Chinese SIPs in each year from 1990 to 2014.  In columns 3 and 
4, we divide the total number of SIPs into two groups based on whether the privatization is 
occurred in domestic or overseas markets.  Column 5 shows the number of IPOs among all 
SIPs.  The number of rights offerings among SIPs are displayed in column 6.  Percentage of 
domestic SIP in column 7 is calculated as number of domestic SIPs divided by the total number 


















1990 3 1 2 1 0 33.33% 0.0916 
1991 2 2 0 2 0 100.00% 0.0790 
1992 14 14 0 12 0 100.00% 0.8005 
1993 25 22 3 24 0 88.00% 1.8006 
1994 24 12 12 21 0 50.00% 1.6577 
1995 10 5 5 8 0 50.00% 0.4249 
1996 36 28 8 33 0 77.78% 1.9358 
1997 88 56 32 79 1 63.64% 6.8866 
1998 43 32 11 34 2 74.42% 2.2901 
1999 29 22 7 26 0 75.86% 2.1959 
2000 48 35 13 46 0 72.92% 10.8817 
2001 37 22 15 35 0 59.46% 6.2671 
2002 21 10 11 16 2 47.62% 5.0704 
2003 36 16 20 30 0 44.44% 10.2651 
2004 42 10 32 31 1 23.81% 13.7578 
2005 41 12 29 28 1 29.27% 30.6041 
2006 54 22 32 38 1 40.74% 52.6264 
2007 87 37 50 49 2 42.53% 72.2061 
2008 60 41 19 23 4 68.33% 28.1535 
2009 80 52 28 33 3 65.00% 44.9951 
2010 143 113 30 56 11 79.02% 67.0328 
2011 119 85 34 39 15 71.43% 74.2395 
2012 142 108 34 64 6 76.06% 59.3877 
2013 216 165 51 33 16 76.39% 51.4409 
2014 94 75 19 32 1 79.79% 21.1889 










Table 10. Capital Raised by H-share Companies 
 
This table is downloaded from China Securities Regulatory Commission’s website. We 
corrected a currency conversion error in the original table. This table shows the capital raised in 
Hong Kong market by Chinese private owned and government owned companies from 1993 to 
2013.  It also reports the number of different types of listing and the number of delisting in the 





















1993 6         1.049 
1994 11         2.234 
1995 2 1       0.379 
1996 6 1 1     1.212 
1997 17 2 2     4.685 
1998 1 2       0.457 
1999 3         0.569 
2000 6         6.790 
2001 8 1   1   0.882 
2002 16 1     2.310 0.015 2.325 
2003 18 3 2   6.119 0.372 6.491 
2004 18 8 1   5.237 2.589 7.826 
2005 12 12   1 17.611 3.037 20.648 
2006 23 11   2 37.463 1.887 39.350 
2007 7 15 1 2 9.601 3.096 12.697 
2008 5 6     3.803 0.753 4.556 
2009 6 8     14.711 1.003 15.714 
2010 7 15     17.750 17.628 35.378 
2011 6 6   1 6.782 4.536 11.318 
2012 9 6   1 8.250 7.714 15.964 
2013 4 10   2 11.317 5.951 17.268 
Total 191 108 7 10   207.792 

















Table 11. Chinese A-Share Market Values and Annual Average AC Ratios 
 
This table shows that Chinese A-share market value and annual average AC ratio from 1991 to 
2013.  AC ratio is calculated as a SOE’s listing proceeds divided by the total Chinese A-share 
market value.  It is a proxy for Chinese stock market absorptive capacity.  We average the AC 
ratios of SOEs which had SIPs in the same year and show the results in the third column labeled 
as “Annual Average AC Ratio”.  This variable can be considered as a measurement of the 
overall market absorptive capacity in one specific year. In addition, we divide the whole sample 
into two groups, before 2007 and after 2007. We run t-test to check if the market absorptive 
capacity is statistically different among the two sub-sample. The results are shown below. 
 
 
Year Chinese A-share market 
Value (US$ bil) 
Annual average AC ratio 
1991 2.3 0.017173913 
1992 18.3 0.003124512 
1993 40.6 0.001773990 
1994 43.5 0.001587835 
1995 42.1 0.001010344 
1996 113.8 0.000472702 
1997 206.4 0.000379214 
1998 231.3 0.000230234 
1999 330.7 0.000228969 
2000 581.0 0.000390199 
2001 524.0 0.000341749 
2002 463.1 0.000576279 
2003 681.2 0.000443207 
2004 639.8 0.000524499 
2005 780.8 0.000933278 
2006 2,430 0.000386731 
2007 6,230 0.000136354 
2008 2,790 0.000190394 
2009 5,010 0.000126494 
2010 4,760 0.000107500 
2011 3,390 0.000190431 
2012 3,700 0.000127387 
2013 3,945 0.000062093 
t-stat  8.005 












Table 12. Probability of Overseas Listing Determined From Probit Models 
 
In this table, we employ a Probit model to discover the relationship between market absorptive 
capacity and firm’s overseas listing decision. The dependent variable in all 3 models is a 
dummy with value of 1 for overseas listing and 0 for domestic listing. AC ratio is defined as a 
firm’s issuing proceeds divided by the Chinese A-share total market value in the issuing year. 
Size is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets. ROA is return on assets. We use quick ratio to 
measure a firm’s liquidity. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by shareholder’s equity. 
The standard errors are reported in the parentheses and ***, **, * denote for significance of 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




























Year fixed effects No No Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0341 0.1587 0.226 























Table 13. Probit Model with Instrumental Variable 
 
In this table, we show the results of a Two-Stage Probit model. The endogenous variable in this 
model is AC Ratio, which is defined as a firm’s issuing proceeds divided by the Chinese A-
share total market value in the issuing year. The instrumental variable is AC Lag, which is 
defined as a firm’s issuing proceeds divided by the Chinese A-share total market value one year 
ahead of the issuing year. In the first stage, the dependent variable is AC Ratio and we run a 
regular OLS regression. In the second stage, we employ a Probit model and the dependent 
variable is Overseas dummy with value of 1 for overseas listing and 0 for domestic listing. Size 
is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets.  ROA is return on assets.  We use quick ratio to measure 
a firm’s liquidity.  Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by shareholder’s equity. The 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses and ***, **, * denote for significance of 1%, 5%, 




 AC Ratio AC Ratio  Overseas = 1 Overseas = 1 
















































Year  No Yes Year  No Yes 
Industry  No Yes Industry  No Yes 




















Table 14. Comparison of Overseas Listing Probabilities Using Propensity Score 
Matching Technique 
 
In this table, we use propensity score matching method to compare the overseas listing 
probabilities for Chinese SOEs with privatizations before and after 2007 (2008).  The SOEs that 
had SIPs before 2007 (2008) are set as treatment group and the SOEs that had SIPs after 2007 
(2008) are set as control group.  The results in the second column show the difference in 
overseas listing probability between the treatment group and the control group without 
matching.  In columns 3 to 8, we use six matching algorithms including Kernel Matching 
(Normal), One Nearest Neighbor Matching with replacement, One Nearest Neighbor Matching 
without replacement, Three Nearest Neighbor Matching with replacement, Radius Matching, 
and Kernel Matching (Epan) and the results are shown in the table labeling by their matching 




















2007 0.159*** 0.081* 0.060 0.072 0.068 0.072 0.067 






























Table 15. Test the Overseas Listing Probability Change of Chinese SOEs with 
Probit Models 
 
This table shows the results of two Probit tests with share issuance data of Chinese private 
firms. The dependent variable in both models is a dummy with value of 1 for overseas listing 
and 0 for domestic listing. After2007 is a dummy with value of 1 if a share issuance happens in 
or after 2007. After2008 is a dummy with value of 1 if a share issuance happens in or after 
2008. AC ratio is defined as a firm’s issuing proceeds divided by the Chinese A-share total 
market value in the issuing year. Size is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets. ROA is return on 
assets. We use quick ratio to measure a firm’s liquidity. Leverage is calculated as total debt 
divided by shareholder’s equity. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses and ***, **, 
* denote for significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 





AC Ratio -0.396** 
(0.194) 






















Industry fixed effect Yes Industry fixed effect Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.3696 Pseudo R2 0.3821 

















Table 16. Statistical Description of the Chinese Private-Owned Firm Sample 
 
This table shows the statistical description of our Chinese private-owned firm sample.  In the 
second column, we report the total number of share issuances accomplished by Chinese private 
firms in each year from 1991 to 2014.  In columns 3 and 4, we divide the total number of 
listings into two groups based on whether the share issuance is occurred in domestic or overseas 
markets.  Percentage of domestic issuance in column 5 is calculated as number of domestic 
listings divided by the total number of listings.  The capital raised from share issuance is 
provided in column 6. 
 
 











1991 15 14 1 93.33% 0.4772 
1992 76 75 1 98.68% 1.6419 
1993 124 117 7 94.35% 8.7334 
1994 49 42 7 85.71% 4.0527 
1995 31 29 2 93.55% 1.1318 
1996 158 152 6 96.20% 7.9109 
1997 169 156 13 92.31% 10.9911 
1998 81 79 2 97.53% 4.0129 
1999 58 49 9 84.48% 4.1019 
2000 111 99 12 89.19% 6.7151 
2001 53 38 15 71.70% 3.5928 
2002 81 61 20 75.31% 3.9695 
2003 87 60 27 68.97% 4.8357 
2004 150 91 59 60.67% 10.2824 
2005 71 12 59 16.90% 4.8954 
2006 181 86 95 47.51% 18.744 
2007 323 156 167 48.30% 65.7676 
2008 189 112 77 59.26% 22.2948 
2009 338 168 170 49.70% 68.8135 
2010 694 445 249 64.12% 132.3481 
2011 524 378 146 72.14% 77.4975 
2012 324 214 110 66.05% 41.854 
2013 350 175 175 50.00% 52.0367 
2014 562 362 200 64.41% 81.2043 











Table 17. Test the Overseas Listing Probability Change of Chinese Private Firms 
with Probit Models 
 
This table shows the results of two Probit tests with share issuance data of Chinese private 
firms. The dependent variable in both models is a dummy with value of 1 for overseas listing 
and 0 for domestic listing. After2007 is a dummy with value of 1 if a share issuance happens in 
or after 2007. After2008 is a dummy with value of 1 if a share issuance happens in or after 
2008. AC ratio is defined as a firm’s issuing proceeds divided by the Chinese A-share total 
market value in the issuing year. Size is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets. ROA is return on 
assets. We use quick ratio to measure a firm’s liquidity. Leverage is calculated as total debt 
divided by shareholder’s equity. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses and ***, **, 
* denote for significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 





AC Ratio -0.396** 
(0.194) 






















Industry fixed effect Yes Industry fixed effect Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.3696 Pseudo R2 0.3821 

















Table 18. Listing strategy patterns between Chinese SOEs and private firms 
 
This table shows the results of two Probit tests with share issuance data of Chinese SOEs and 
private firms. The dependent variable in both models is a dummy with value of 1 for overseas 
listing and 0 for domestic listing. SOE is a dummy with value of 1 for SOEs and 0 for private 
firms. After2007 is a dummy with value of 1 if a share issuance happens in or after 2007. 
After2008 is a dummy with value of 1 if a share issuance happens in or after 2008. AC ratio is 
defined as a firm’s issuing proceeds divided by the Chinese A-share total market value in the 
issuing year. Size is the logarithm of a firm’s total assets. ROA is return on assets. We use quick 
ratio to measure a firm’s liquidity. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by shareholder’s 
equity. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses and ***, **, * denote for significance 
of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 













AC ratio -0.131* 
(0.073) 






















Industry fixed effect Yes Industry fixed effect Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.1978 Pseudo R2 0.2206 













Table 19. Comparison of Three Flotation Methods in China 
 
Panel A shows the yearly number of issuance and capital raised (in billion RMB) for each one 
of the three flotation methods which are frequently used in China. Panel B and C show the 
usage frequency (in percentage) of each flotation method. Percentages in Panel B are calculated 
by number of issuance. Percentages in Panel C are calculated by capital raised. The sample 




   Private Placement Rights offering Public offering 
























1992 2 0.31   2 0.305   
1993 61 7.07   61 7.074   
1994 58 4.68   58 4.68   
1995 62 5.03   62 5.033   
1996 41 7.54   41 7.535   
1997 108 25.18   108 25.181   
1998 145 36.73   143 35.368 2 1.36 
1999 115 28.56 2 0.92 112 26.22 1 1.416 
2000 186 66.87   174 55.889 12 10.985 
2001 95 45.50 1 0.22 78 28.922 16 16.354 
2002 39 17.25 1 0.20 19 4.978 19 12.068 
2003 38 16.73   23 5.899 15 10.829 
2004 34 26.26   23 10.429 11 15.835 
2005 4 26.98     4 26.98 
2006 58 102.44 49 91.06 3 1.152 6 10.23 
2007 180 350.83 144 261.15 7 23.255 29 66.425 
2008 141 223.17 107 164.61 8 13.95 26 44.606 
2009 139 299.01 116 265.22 10 10.597 13 23.191 
2010 184 496.51 153 307.92 21 150.875 10 37.714 
2011 197 416.99 175 352.97 12 35.143 10 28.879 
2012 166 346.48 153 327.89 7 7.042 6 11.547 
2013 284 405.39 266 352.16 13 46.21 5 7.016 
2014 488 678.72 473 664.32 14 14.039 1 0.365 
2015 827 1279.86 822 1264.10 5 15.762   















 Percentage usage of each method (by number) 
Year Private placement Rights offering public offering 
1992 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1993 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1994 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1995 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1996 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1997 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1998 0.00% 98.62% 1.38% 
1999 1.74% 97.39% 0.87% 
2000 0.00% 93.55% 6.45% 
2001 1.05% 82.11% 16.84% 
2002 2.56% 48.72% 48.72% 
2003 0.00% 60.53% 39.47% 
2004 0.00% 67.65% 32.35% 
2005 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
2006 84.48% 5.17% 10.34% 
2007 80.00% 3.89% 16.11% 
2008 75.89% 5.67% 18.44% 
2009 83.45% 7.19% 9.35% 
2010 83.15% 11.41% 5.43% 
2011 88.83% 6.09% 5.08% 
2012 92.17% 4.22% 3.61% 
2013 93.66% 4.58% 1.76% 
2014 96.93% 2.87% 0.20% 
2015 99.40% 0.60% 0.00% 























 Percentage usage of each method (by number) 
Year Private placement Rights offering public offering 
1992 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1993 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1994 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1995 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1996 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1997 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
1998 0.00% 96.30% 3.70% 
1999 3.23% 91.81% 4.96% 
2000 0.00% 83.57% 16.43% 
2001 0.49% 63.57% 35.94% 
2002 1.18% 28.86% 69.96% 
2003 0.00% 35.26% 64.74% 
2004 0.00% 39.71% 60.29% 
2005 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
2006 88.89% 1.12% 9.99% 
2007 74.44% 6.63% 18.93% 
2008 73.76% 6.25% 19.99% 
2009 88.70% 3.54% 7.76% 
2010 62.02% 30.39% 7.60% 
2011 84.65% 8.43% 6.93% 
2012 94.63% 2.03% 3.33% 
2013 86.87% 11.40% 1.73% 
2014 97.88% 2.07% 0.05% 
2015 98.77% 1.23% 0.00% 


























       Variables Description/Proxy 
Firm Characteristics  
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Real Sales Total revenue adjusted for inflation using the Consumer 
Price Indices 
Real Net Profit Net profit adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price 
Indices 
Growth rate Growth rate of total revenue 
ROA Net profit/Total assets 
ROE Net profit/Equity 
ROS Net profit/Total revenue 
Capital Expenditures Capital expenditures 
EBIT Operating profit 
Turnover Total revenue/Total assets 
Current Ratio Current assets/Current liabilities 
Employees Number of employees 
Number of Analysts Number of analysts following a stock 
Top-five Stock shares held by top-five shareholders (%) 
Institutional Ownership Stock shares held by institutions (%) 





SEO Type Public offering or Rights offering or Private placement 
SEO size Capital raised in seasoned equity offering 
Bid-ask Spread (%) 100(1 - bid/ask) 
Price Discount Percentage by which the offer-price of new shares is lower 
than the closing price on the day before the issue 
Take-up Rate (In Rights offering) Percentage of newly issued shares 
purchased by the existing shareholders 
Blockholder Take-up 
Rate  
(In Private placement) Percentage of newly issued shares 












Table 21. Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Variables 
 























 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Panel A: Firm characteristics  
size (log(total asset)) 3020 0.34 1.32 0.15 
Lagged top-five shares (%) 2145 9.23 10.74 6.37 
Lagged inst. ownership (%) 1755 13.90 13.35 9.89 
Ln(market value) 2056 2.54 1.02 2.44 
ROA 2959 4.77 5.64 4.43 
Current ratio 2961 2.94 41.23 1.55 
Revenue growth rate (%) 2973 63.50 204.58 21.22 
Lagged analyst 2858 1.39 2.36 0.00 
Lagged insider (%) 1213 18.83 23.52 4.10 
Block holder (%) 3219 15.48 31.64 0.00 
     
Panel B: SOE 
characteristics 
    
Price discount (%) 3109 29.70 27.98 28.24 
SEO size (% of market 
value) 
1996 11.40 14.39 7.70 
Take-up rate 984 62.33 28.21 54.91 
Bid-ask spread 2970 0.02 0.72 0.01 
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Table 22. Valuation Effects of Three Flotation Methods 
 
This table shows the valuation effects of all three equity flotation methods. CARs from our 
event studies over the 3-, 5-, and 7-day windows are reported. Our market model is estimated 
over the period of day -270 to day -21. Market returns are calculated with the Shanghai 
Composite Index. For private placement, we always exclude the observations with more than 
one month stock suspension following the placing announcements. Panel A shows the valuation 
effects for our entire sample from 1992 to 2015. In panel B, PO_pre (RO_pre) shows the 
valuation effects of public offerings (rights offerings) from 1992 to 2005 and PO_post 
(RO_post) shows the valuation effects of public offerings (rights offerings) from 2005 to 2015. 
In addition, the changes of valuation effects from pre-2005 to post-2005 period are reported. In 
panel C, we divide rights offering observations into two groups using the median take-up rate 
(54.9%). We further show the valuation effect difference between the group with high take-up 
rate and the group with low take-up rate. In panel D, we divide our private placement 
observations into two groups based on the blockholder percentage take-up and show the 
valuation effect difference between the two groups. 
 









Panel B: Pre and post-2005 (mean effects %) 
 
 PO_pre PO_post Diff RO_pre RO_post Diff 
T-1 to T+1 -3.25*** 0.88*** 4.13*** -0.39*** -0.30** 0.09 
T-2 to T+2 -3.42*** 0.1 3.52*** -0.40** -0.77** -0.37 
T-3 to T+3 -4.01*** -0.19 3.82*** -0.71*** -8.53*** -7.82*** 
 
Panel C: Rights offerings: by take-up rate 
 
 
Panel D: Private placement: by blockholder percentage take-up 
 
Private Placement < 50% ≥50% Difference 
T-1 to T+1 0.84*** 1.57*** 0.73 
T-2 to T+2 1.85*** 3.76*** 1.91*** 
T-3 to T+3 2.10*** 4.48*** 2.38*** 
 
 
 Public Offering Right Offering Private Placement 
T-1 to T+1 -1.09*** -0.39*** 1.33*** 
T-2 to T+2 -1.70*** -0.44** 2.69*** 
T-3 to T+3 -2.15*** -1.55*** 3.24*** 
Right Offering <Med >Med Difference 
T-1 to T+1 -0.83*** 0.07 0.90*** 
T-2 to T+2 -0.96*** 0.08 1.04*** 
T-3 to T+3 -1.32*** -1.78*** -0.46 
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Table 23. Cross-sectional Regressions for CARs for Private placements 
 
This table shows the results from cross-sectional regressions for private placements. Dependent 
variables are the 3- or 5-day CARs from our event studies. In both model (1) and (2), we 
exclude private placements with more than 30 days of stock suspension following the 
announcements. Our sample is divided into three groups based on placing firm’s post-placement 
insider ownership. Baseline group has 0 to 5% post-placement insider ownership, middle group 
has 5% to 25% post-placement insider ownership, and high group has more than 25% post-







































 (1) (2) 
 PP30 -1 to 1 PP30 -2 to 2 
Firm size (log(total assets)) -0.09 0.06 
Change in Insider (%) -0.59* -0.68* 
Change in Insider*middle group 0.56** 0.64* 
Change in Insider*high group 0.61*** 0.73** 
Lagged Institutional ownership (%) 0.02 0.02 
Block holder take up rate (%) 0.01 0.00 
Price discount (%) -0.03*** -0.04*** 
Log market value -0.45 -0.62 
SEO size -0.04 -0.08** 
Observations 714 712 
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Table 24. Marginal Effects on the Choice of Equity Flotation Methods 
 
This table shows the marginal effects from our multinomial logit model. Coefficients from the 
original multinomial logit regression are not reported but available upon request. All standard 
errors are clustered at the year level. The results can be interpreted as the change in probability 
of choosing one specific method associated with one unit change in corresponding predictor. All 
variables pertaining to firm characteristics are lagged by one year. ***, **, and * denote 

























Model: Multinomial Logit 
Explanatory Variable Marginal Effect on 
Prob (Public 
Offering) % 
Marginal Effect on 
Prob (Rights 
Offering) % 
Marginal Effect on 
Prob (Private 
Placement) % 
Size  -0.61 1.18* -0.56 
ROE (%) 0.17** 0.04 -0.21** 
Current Ratio -1.85* -0.91 2.75*** 
Growth Rate (revenue, %) 0.01 -0.01** 0.00 
Number of analysts 0.83*** -0.11 -0.72*** 
Bid-ask spread -0.16 -0.04 0.20*** 
Top five (%) 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
Insiders (%) -0.03 0.02 0.01 
Price discount (%) -0.09** 0.10* -0.02 
SEO size 0.21 -1.35 1.15 
Observations: 1004    
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Table 25. Univariate Analysis of Monitoring 
 
This table shows the mean and median ownership percentages of issuing firms prior and post to 
their issuance as well as the mean and median percentage changes in ownership following their 
equity issuance. The three equity flotation methods that we compare in this table are private 
placement, public offering, and rights offering. Ownership is measured in two ways. Top 5 is 
the percentage shares owned by the largest five blockholders. Institutional ownership is the 
percentage shares owned by institutional investors. Significance levels for the changes in means 


































 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Obs. 
Private placement        
Top 5 9.17 6.20 10.31 7.78 1.15*** 1.58*** 1955 
Institutional ownership 
 
13.59 9.56 14.79 11.81 1.20*** 2.25*** 1693 
Public offering        
Top 5 9.79 7.38 10.34 8.35 0.55 0.97 107 
Institutional ownership 
 
17.62 13.34 17.69 15.03 0.07 1.69 92 
Rights offering        
Top 5 9.90 8.11 8.02 5.99 -1.88 -2.12** 115 
Institutional ownership 16.24 13.27 16.50 10.98 0.26 -2.29 89 
116 
Figure 1. Shanghai Stock Exchange Market Data 
 
This figure shows the market cap, the number of annual total transactions, the annual total 
trading volume, and the annual total turnover in Shanghai Stock Exchange. All data are from 
1991 to 2012. 
 
Panel A. Market cap in Shanghai stock exchange 
 
 
























Figure 2. Percentage Domestic Issuance for State-Owned and Private-Owned 
Enterprises 
 
This figure displays the time series trend of domestic issuance. Panel A shows the percentage of 
domestic issuance by SOEs which is calculated as the number of domestic SIPs in one year 
divided by the total number of SIPs in the same year. Panel B shows the percentage of domestic 
issuance by private-owned firms which is calculated as the number of domestic issuance by 











Figure 3. Comparison of Three Flotation Methods in China 
 
This figure displays the usage proportion of each flotation method in China over the period of 
1992 to 2015. Three most commonly used flotation methods are included in this figure. The 
orange bar shows the proportion of rights offering, the gray bar shows the proportion of public 
offering, and the blue bar shows the proportion of private placement. In Panel A, the proportion 
of one method is calculated as the number of issuance through this method in one year divided 
by the total number of seasoned equity issuance through all of the three methods in the same 
year. In Panel B, the proportion of one method is calculated as the capital raised through this 
method in one year divided by the total capital raised through all of the three methods in the 
same year.  
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